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The intricacies and legalities concerning the notion that under certain 
circumstances a director may be regarded as an employee have given rise to 
much litigation in the past two decades. It is humbly submitted that few 
scenarios have created as much confusion and grief as the aforementioned 
idea in our South African jurisprudence. 
For the past two decades lawyers have jousted in the CCMA, Labour Court 
and Labour Appeals Court on the question of whether or not a company 
director is an employee and subject to the protection from unfair dismissal 
contained in the LRA. 
This dissertation approaches the controversial topic by examining the history 
and origin of the concept of the office of director. The legislative framework 
concerning company and labour law is examined along with the judicial 
decisions which have shaped this particular aspect of the law. A brief 
overview of comparative labour law is discussed in an attempt to gain a multi-
national view of the matter. 
Throughout this dissertation it is of cardinal importance to view the text 
through both the lenses of Company- and Employment Law. Failing to do so 
will have the inevitable result that one does not properly reflect and weigh in 
on the theoretical implications associated with the development of both these 
branches of law.  
 As with any systematic analysis it is imperative to elucidate certain key 
features and fundamental aspects to ensure that the subject matter in 
question is understood in its entirety.  
A brief excursion to the grass roots of company law, and more specifically, 
scrutinization of the sui generis nature of the concept of a company, director 
and a board of directors is warranted.  
In the following chapter the abovementioned concepts will be explored to 
ensure that a thorough understanding of the fundamentals of company law 
accompany this study into the unique convergence of labour and commercial 
law. 
The objective of this dissertation is to ascertain to which extent the statement 
that a dismissal of an executive is sui generis and differs from that of a 
regular employee proves correct. Accordingly, it is necessary to venture into 
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the unique aspects of the Director’s fiduciary role in the company and the 
boards they serve in order to fully understand why it has been argued that a 
director is a sui generis employee.  
1.1 The origins of the concepts of Directors, Boards and Companies 
1.1.1 The 1694 Charter of the Bank of England 
Whilst it is generally accepted history that the origins of the concept of 
“Director” and a subsequent board of Directors is estimated to be several 
hundred years old scholars are unable to pinpoint the exact time and place. 
Contrary to popular belief the existence of companies and directors predates 
the industrial revolution when a vast array of machines were engineered to 
increase productivity and technology advanced in leaps and bounds. 
The earliest known recording of the term “Directors” is contained in the 1694 
Charter of the Bank of England (“the Charter”).1 The Charter also referred to 
a court of proprietors which were responsible for electing the Directors.2 One 
can only surmise that this would be contemporaneously be known as 
shareholders exercising voting rights at a meeting of shareholders or annual 
general meeting.  
The Charter provided that there had to be a quorum of twenty four Directors, 
weekly meetings had to be held regarding the running of the affairs of the 
Board (and inversely, the Bank of England) and one third of the Directors 
could not run for re-election.3 
It is interesting to note that many of the requirements placed upon the bank 
of England form part of the standard parcel of clauses found in the articles of 
association of a varied and diverse range of companies in the contemporary 
world. Quorum and tenure clauses are found in the articles of association or 
similar founding documents of nearly every company to ensure that the 
directors remain accountable to the shareholders of the company. 
                                                             
1  O’Donnel, C. Origins of the Corporate Executive 26 Bull Bus Hist Soc’y 55 (1951). 
2  Gevurtz, F.A. The Historical and Political Origins of The Corporote Board of 
Directors Hofstra Law Review. 
3  Ibid p 110. 
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1.1.2 The English Trading Companies 
During the 1600-1700’s the English, using their status as the old world’s 
foremost naval superpower, employed the use of trading companies to 
charter and explore the New World. These trading companies, the East India 
Company, South Sea Company and the Levant Company inter alia, provide 
evidence that early formations of corporate structures, reminiscent of our 
modern day Board of Directors, were intimately involved in the management 
of the entities.  
The East India Company for example was provided with its managing board 
by Queen Elizabeth I.4 
 It is evident that the subsequent charters to the New World, in particular the 
Americas’, provided the catalyst for the reception and formation of the 
corporate board in North America.  
The Bank of America provided in its Charter of 1791 for a twenty five member 
board of directors, with the caveat that a quarter of its directors were barred 
from re-election. It is submitted that the causal link between the 1791 Charter 
and the English Charter of 1694 is quite evident.5  
1.1.3 The Dutch East India Company 
The Dutch East India Company, which was eventually responsible for the 
construction of a supply post on what is today known as the Cape Peninsula, 
also functioned in accordance with a board of directors-like structure. 
This “board” was known as the bewindhebbers, it consisted of sixty members 
from various Dutch towns and could likely have attributed to the eventual 
reception of early forms of corporate governance in South Africa. 6  This 
possibility is also shadowed by the fact that our Law of Contract is shaped, 
and to a large extent inherited, from the English Law of Contract. 
                                                             
4  The “Board” was known as The Governor and Company of Merchants of London , 
Trading in the West Indies. 
5  Ibid p. 125 
6  Ibid p.127 
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It is submitted that it is an impressively difficult task to ascertain exactly when 
and where the first Board of Directors came into practice. The 
aforementioned information provides a base point from where speculation 
can be made as to where the concept of a Board of Directors was first 
introduced. A far easier enquiry is why it was necessary to formulate the 
concept. The notion of a board of directors responsible for the management 
and long term viability of a company may seem obvious and is taken for 
granted in modern civilization but the establishment thereof was a novel and 
exciting development of mercantile law.  
1.2 The raison d'être 
 
It has already been established (to a certain extent permissible with the 
limited information available) that the first signs of something remotely similar 
to our modern Board of Directors and executives originated from England. 
England, with its rich feudal history and concomitant arrangement of villages 
living beneath the authority of the Feudal Lord who in turn served as the 
subordinate of the King (or Queen) was perhaps the perfect locale for the 
development of the concept of a Board of Directors.  
The old fable of King Arthur and his Knights of the Round Table seem an apt 
enough simile for a Board of Directors with its Chief Executive Officer 
(Arthur), Directors (the Knights) and shareholders (the bourgeoisie in a 
benevolent Monarchy). 
In reality (perhaps unfortunately), early forms of corporate governance 
appeared more readily in the local clergy and political spheres of the Middle 
Ages than descended from myth.7 
The discovery of the new world and the impending riches which became 
available via the use of trading companies as proxies presented a new type 
of dilemma for aspiring businessmen. How do we manage this massive and 
                                                             
7  Gevurtz, F. A. The European Origins and the Spread of the Corporate Board of    
Directors p 926 Stetson Law Revied 2004. 
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intricate business model? A rather obvious solution came in the way the local 
Church was composed.8 
Medieval Europe, and England specifically, was dominated by the Christian 
theology and the Roman Catholic Church. The clergy was held in high 
esteem and separation of state and church was but a notion held by only a 
few of the more rebellious philosophers. It was therefore only natural that the 
structure of the local Church would be adopted to a certain extent.  
An early example of basic corporate governance exercised by the Church 
can be found in the conversion of the Roman Maxim “quod omnes tangit ab 
omnibus approbetur”, or, “What touches all, must be approved by all” from a 
guideline to codified Canon Law.9 The aforementioned principle eventually 
migrated to other entities or collective groups of people.10 
It can be readily accepted that the adoption of governance structures by early 
medieval associations was motivated by the need for effective management 
of the commercial affairs of ever expanding companies. The rise in trade and 
the accessibility of foreign markets coupled with the increased need for 
goods and services due to colonisation and expansion into new territories 
served as the perfect catalyst for the transition of guilds into mercantile 
powerhouses. 
The aforementioned attempts to understand and answer the question of how 
and when the notion of a company, directors and their concomitant boards, 
were established. It does not answer what the purpose of the board was. 
Moving away from the historical origin and more to the conceptual rationale 
for a corporate board the following question begs answering; is it appropriate 
to state that sole purpose of a board of directors is to ensure improved 
management of commercial affairs? 
                                                             
8  Further examples were found in parliamentary assemblies, town councils, mercantile 
guilds. All of the aforementioned entities were normally run by an elected 
representative body. Gevurtz, F. A. The European Origins and the Spread of the 
Corporate Board of   Directors p 926 Stetson Law Review 2004. 
9  See in this regard Watner, C. Quod Omnes Tangit: Consent Theory in the Radical 
Libertarian Tradition in the Middle Ages Journal of Libertarian Studies Volume 19 
Edition 2 2005 P67 and Gevurtz European Origins p 949 – 950. 
10  Gervurtz, Origins p 950. 
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The Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct contained in the King Report 
on Corporate Governance for South Africa 11 provides that, inter alia, the 
Board is responsible for determining the purpose and values of the company, 
the Board should exercise leadership and implement strategy to ensure the 
company fulfils the purpose which it was created for and the Board should 
ensure compliance with applicable legislation. 
It appears from the above mentioned that the true role and purpose of the 
Board entails a trichotomy between effective management of the company’s 
affairs, strategic leadership and acting as curators in the best interests of the 
company.  
The Board is duty bound to act in the best interests of the company and to 
ensure that its function is carried out properly it relies on the expertise and 
actions taken by its individual directors. The following section will examine 
the nature and scope of a Director’s role under the common law and statutory 
law. 
1.3 Directors under the Common Law 
It cannot be disputed that Directors hold a unique and significant position in 
the companies in which they serve. The executive decisions they make serve 
to carry out the fundamental core business of the company and their strategic 
leadership is intrinsically linked to the commercial fate of the enterprise.  
The office of director preceded the statutory legislative framework and as a 
result thereof the legal consequences of occupying the office of director was 
largely regulated by the common law as the need arised for development. In 
contemporary South Africa a large portion of these duties and obligations 
have been codified.12 
Directors are in a position of trust vis-à-vis the enterprise they serve as a 
result of the ex officio nature of their position. For purposes of brevity and to 
                                                             
11  Specifically King II (2002) 




avoid prolixity, several of such fiduciary duties shall be mentioned 
hereunder:13 
I. The duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company; 
II. To exercise powers for their proper purpose; 
III. To exercise independent judgment in decision making; 
IV. Not to use confidential information for personal profit; 
V. To exercise care and skill in the discharge of their functions; 
VI. To avoid conflicts of interest.14 
It is clear that since the introduction of companies there has always been an 
appreciation for the fact that a Director is something more than just a regular 
employee hence the reason for burdening them with the abovementioned 
fiduciary duties. The position and office of director has since its inception 
been held in high esteem and reserved for only the most capable of people.15 
Even though many of these duties have been codified by the Companies 
Act16 the importance of the common law is still evident in the jurisprudence of 
the Courts. 
1.4 Directors under the statutory law 
1.4.1 History 
It is widely known that South Africa inherited its company law17 from England 
largely as a result of the political relations we shared as an early dominium 
within the British League of Nations.  
Without any legislative framework of its own South Africa relied on the Joint 
Stock Companies Registration Act18 which was later amended by the Limited 
                                                             
13  A in-depth review and examination of the duties is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
14  Directors Guide 2011 Smit Tabata Buchanan Boyes. 
15  It may well be observed that this is unfortunately no longer the case. 
16  Act 71 of 2008. 
17  South Africa’s law of contract is also inherited from English law and our law of delict 
is based largely on the English Tort Law see in this regard Cohen v Segal 1970 (3) 
SA 702 (W). 
18  1844. 
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Liability Act 19. A plethora of derivative acts ensued mainly as a result of 
legislative changes to the English framework.20 
The Companies Act 61 of 1973 served as the first piece of legislation that 
started the emancipation from English Law (although South African company 
law is still heavily influenced by the English law). 
The Companies Act  71 of 2008, as amended, is the current source of South 
African company law and its Part F governs the appointment, removal of and 
status of Directors.21 
The remainder of a director’s duties and aspects unique to such office flow 
forth from the common law which has been passed over by generations of 
jurisprudence.  
1.5 Fiduciary duties and sui generis employees 
The following quote is perhaps one of the most apt and succinct explanations 
of the duties, role and importance directors play in a company: 
“The directors of a limited company are the creatures of statute and occupy a 
position peculiar to themselves. It has often been said that they are really 
commercial men managing a trading concern for themselves and all other 
shareholders in it. They occupy a fiduciary position towards the company and 
must exercise their powers bona fide solely for the benefit of the company as 
a whole and not for an ulterior motive. They may not advance their own 
interests at the expense of the company.”22 
Directors stand in a unique position and are not merely senior managers but 
something more.23 As the gatekeepers for the company’s strategic goals and 
final decision makers directors have certain fundamental fiduciary duties 
which vest in them ex lege. Traditionally it has been considered that 
“Directors are the company’s directing mind and will, they are the human 
                                                             
19  1855. 
20  See inter alia; The Cape Companies Act of 1892, Union Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
Hahlo’s South African Company Law Through the Cases 6th Ed 
21  To be discussed further detail later in this dissertation. 
22  Cohen v Segal 1970  3 SA 702 W. 
23  There is however jurisprudence to the effect that senior managers also have certain 
fiduciary duties which are bestowed unto them.  
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agents of a company tasked with its management. Although the office they 
hold also resembles that of a trustee or managing partner, directors remain a 
creature of statute, occupying a position peculiar to themselves”.24 
Prior reference has been briefly made in regard to certain of these duties and 
it is deemed apposite to venture into South African jurisprudence to examine 
the extent and nature of the duties owed by directors in order to fully 
comprehend that directors are encumbered with duties beyond that of the 
ordinary employee.  
1.5.1 The Duty of Care and Skill 
Directors have a duty to perform their functions with the utmost care and skill. 
Should a Director be found to have acted with malice or gross negligence in 
relation to the exercise of his function he could be held liable for the ensuing 
damage as a result thereof.   
Our jurisprudence has also confirmed that where a director has specialised 
knowledge of the business of his company (e.g. a rubber manufacturer) it is 
expected of him to use such knowledge to the advantage of the company 
and a director with such knowledge will face greater liability for an error in 
judgment than one without.25 Even though the specialist knowledge does not 
fall within the ambit of the specific director’s duties the mere fact that he is in 
position thereof yet does not apply it already infringe upon this duty. 
1.5.2 The Duty to Act in the Best Interests of the Company 
Whilst the abovementioned duty ought to form the basis of any contract of 
employment between a company and its employees our Courts have 
specifically regarded this as an essential fiduciary duty which Directors must 
comply with at all material times.26 
It can be argued that the duty to act in the best interests of the Company 
forms the foundation from which the remainder of a director’s duties flows 
                                                             
24  Stoop, H The company director as employee 2011 32 ILJ 2367. 
25  In Re: Brazillian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd [19110 1 Ch 425. See also In 
Re: City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] 1 Ch 407. 
26  Treasure Trove Diamonds Ltd v Hyman 1928 AD 464. 
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from. Should a director act ultra vires the scope of his appointment, act only 
as a conduit for an external third party, act in a manner which is not 
illustrative of the utmost skill and care or allows themselves to be placed in a 
position with a conflict of interest then such a director has failed to act in the 
best interests of the Company.  
Irrespective of the aforementioned, Directors are officers of the company 
entrusted with the management and implementation of its strategy. This flows 
from the duty to act in the best interests of the company and are perhaps on 
the most important fundamental elements of a Director’s role and 
responsibility in a corporate enterprise. 
1.5.3 The Duty to Act within their Powers 
Directors cannot act outside the power of their mandate, this forms part of the 
essential checks and balances to ensure that the shareholders are protected 
against flagrant abuse of the company by the directors. They cannot make 
decisions which fall squarely within the ambit of shareholders such as 
declaring a dividend without input from the shareholders.27 
It stands to reason that any decision taken ultra vires which has subsequently 
caused damages would entitle the company to take action against such 
director to recoup the damages.  
1.5.4 The Duty to Act Independently 
A decision taken by a Director must be done without any undue influence 
exerted by an external party. A Director must remain independent and 
exercise “unfettered discretion” in the best interests of the Company.28  
A director may not agree to vote a certain way or bind themselves to the will 
of a third party e.g. a director may not agree to receiving a commission in 
regard to a transaction which was concluded between the company and a 
third party due to the director exercising a decision based upon the undue 
                                                             
27  See in this regard In Re: George Newman & Co [1895} 1 Ch 674. 
28  Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates plc [1994] 1 BCLC 363. 
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influence of such third party. In certain cases it might be excessively difficult 
to distinguish between this duty and the duty to avoid a conflict of interest. 
1.5.5 The Duty to Avoid a Conflict of Interest 
One of the fundamental principles which all employees subscribe to is to 
undertake to avoid a conflict of interest vis-à-vis themselves and the 
Company they work for. As Directors are in a position of trust the Courts 
have identified a distinct duty imposed upon them to ensure they are never 
placed in a position where their integrity may be compromised due to a 
conflict of interests. 
This does not mean that a Director may never receive an income from a 
source indirectly linked to the company in which they are employed. A 
notable example of such an additional stream of income would be ownership 
of shares in a holding company which leases immovable property to the 
company. The true purpose of the aforementioned fiduciary duty is to 
determine whether or not the director has made a secret profit. 
If the conflict has been disclosed and the other directors have signified that 
they have no objection to the transaction the conduct may be deemed to be 
lawful. The most basic tenet of this duty is that a Director never places 
themselves in a position where they must make a decision between their own 
personal gain or that of the company. 
1.6 Sui generis employees 
When one has regard to the aforementioned information and the litany of 
cases involving Directors and the fiduciary duties which encumber them it is 
undeniable that Directors are not ordinary employees but stand in a unique 
position.  
They are the custodians of the Company tasked with proper and due 
management in the best interests of the Company and, by implication, 
looking after the best interests of the shareholders. The position of trust 
between a company and its Directors implies that the relationship between 
the entity and its executives is one of uberimma fides. 
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The abovementioned and the inherent need for business flexibility have given 
rise to the notion that directors are not “mere units of labour” and that the 
entrenched employment laws of the Republic are not applicable to Directors. 
It will be seen in the study of the ensuing law reports that employers have 
tried this approach multiple times. 
The basic premise of the argument is that directors occupy a special position 
in the hierarchical structure of the company and that employment laws 
concerning fair labour practices and protection from unfair dismissal apply 
only to regular workers. It has further been argued that as the rationale for 
protective labour laws is the disproportionate balance of power between 
employee and employer, directors, not necessarily bound to this balance of 
power, should be excluded from the ambit thereof. 29  
At the opposite end of this argument lies the belief that Directors, in essence, 
hold two distinctive positions in a company. One, as an executive, governed 
by company law and, secondly, an employee, governed by employment law. 
The latter approach seems to have been the preferred interpretation by the 
South African Labour Courts and Tribunals. 
In the matter of Greaves & Others v Barnard30 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that the fact that the Appellant before the court was a director was a 
significant factor to consider when deciding whether or not to grant a 
spoliation order for the settings aside of a decision to suspend the Appellant. 
The Court held that: 
“ 'Respondent occupied the property in question in his capacity as 
an executive director of and shareholder in third appellant with the 
rights and interests described in the shareholders' agreement. The 
respondent's interest in his possession of the property materially 
transcended those of a mere agent or employee. He clearly 
performed his work and occupied his office "with the intention of 
securing some benefit for himself'.”  
                                                             
29  See PG Group Limited v Mbambo N.O and Others JR 215/2004 2004 ZALC . See 
further Singh, S Are Directors also Employees? www.europassistance.co.za Date of 
Access 5 August 2013. 
30  2007 2 SA 593 (C). 
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A regular employee’s only right of recourse against an unfair suspension is to 
apply in terms of the LRA to the CCMA or Labour Court for the settings aside 
thereof. The fact that a director is entitled to bring a spoliation order against 
the company who has suspended him is indicative of the fact that a director 
is not a mere employee. 
 
There has been a litany of cases regarding the thorny issue of whether or not 
directors are employees and entitled to the protection of employment laws. It 
is humbly submitted that the matter should not yet be viewed as settled law 
given the sheer volume of cases involving a near carbon copy of the 
argument that directors are not employees.  
 
2. The Companies Act 
2.1 Definitions 
The Companies Act (hereafter “the Act)” is the cornerstone of commercial 
and corporate law in the Republic and was promulgated in 2008 after 
immense scrutiny and dissent regarding earlier drafts of the Companies Act 
which replaced the previous Companies Act of 197331. 
It is deemed apposite to include the following definitions in this dissertation32: 
2.1.1 Alternate Director 
The Act defines an alternate director as a person elected or appointed to 
serve, as the occasion requires, as a member of the board of a company in 
substitution for a particular elected or appointed director of that company. 
2.1.2 Director 
                                                             
31  Act 61 of 1973. 




The Act defines a Director as a member of the board of a company…or an 
alternate director of a company and includes any person occupying the 
position of a director or alternate director, by whatever name designated. 
There are a number of interesting aspects in this definition which may be 
expanded upon. Firstly, does a non-executive director or a professional 
director meet the requirements to be regarded as a director? The definition of 
“board” leaves us with the perplexity of an infinite loop and does not assist in 
answering this question. 
Secondly, an alternate director is included in the definition. If it is assumed 
that an alternate director would normally be a senior manager in the 
company, if that senior manager is dismissed or resigns does he have a right 
to remain on the board or does he have a right to sue for damages as a 
consequence of the loss of office?  
Third and finally, any person occupying the position of a director, irrespective 
of his title, is also considered to be a director in terms of the definition and 
concomitantly is bound by the fiduciary duties of care, skill and diligence. 
Upon closer scrutiny it is evident that the definition is wide enough to cover 
so called “de facto directors”. In In Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd33 the Court held 
as follows: 
“A de facto director is a person who assumes to act as a director. He is held 
out as a director by the company, and claims and purports to be a director, 
although never actually or validly appointed as such. To establish that a 
person is a de facto director of a company, it is necessary to plead and prove 
that he undertook the functions in relation to the company which could 
properly be discharged only by a director”. 
What is the impact of this distinction for labour law in South Africa? The 
question whether or not someone is a de facto director may indeed have a 
far-reaching effect the reason being that Directors are held to a different 
standard in the workplace. A Director is expected to hit the ground running 
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and poor performance of his duties can cause massive damage to the 
company as a whole.  
The regular norms and standards of progressive discipline do not necessarily 
apply mutatis mutandis to Directors due to the very nature of their office and 
the responsibilities which they bear.  
The following hypothetical situation can serve as an apposite example of the 
abovementioned:  
Company A, a wholesale supplier of fruit to Retailer A, intends embarking on 
a disciplinary process against its in-house accountant. The accountant has 
only been with the company for six months. The company is run by its 
managing director, who is the sole appointed director for the company. There 
is no properly constituted board of directors or corporate governance as it is 
a small business and the incorporated company is merely used for its legal 
personality. 
The accountant compiles the general ledger, does all the financial reporting 
and legislative requirements to ensure compliance with the relevant acts. The 
accountant negligently forgets to pay the Receiver of Revenue timeously and 
as a result the company is forced to pay penalty fee of several thousands of 
rands. The company could argue that the accountant is a de facto financial 
director and should have known better, that he did not comply with the 
common law duties of care, skill and diligence. Not only would this lower the 
bar required to prove that the negligence was serious that it breached the 
trust relationship between employee and employer it would also open the 
door for allowing additional charges to be levelled against employees. 
The converse would also be possible, what if the employee were to claim that 
he was actually a de facto director entitled to voting rights and / or directors 
remuneration. What if he were to be dismissed as an employee but then 
claim damages in terms of the Act.34 
                                                             
34  sec 71(9). 
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These questions are, regrettably, beyond the scope of this dissertation but 
provide interesting food for thought nonetheless.  
2.1.3 Board 
The Act defines this simply as “the board of directors of a company”. Given 
the context that has been given to “Director” “Alternate Director” and a de 
facto Director the brevity of this definition could serve to cause more 
confusion than necessary.  
The problems which arise are numerous. If we were to look at the 
hypothetical situation of the fruit wholesaler how would we describe the 
composition of the Board. Would it only be the owner/statutory director or 
would the de facto Director need to be included. If we were to take the 
example further and suggest that the accountant has been dismissed, proves 
his dismissal was unfair, that he was a de facto Director and is awarded 
compensation by the CCMA  would the commissioner be entitled to take this 
fact into consideration.  
2.1.4 Ex Officio Director 
The Act defines and ex officio director as “a person who holds office as a 
director of a particular company solely as a consequence of that person 
holding some other office, title, designation or similar status specified in the 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation. This type of director is not 
appointed specifically by a vote of the shareholders. This relates to people 
who are in a managerial position yet do not use the title of “Director”. A 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (hereafter “MOI”) may determine 
that the financial manager of the company will always be an ex officio 
Director.35 
2.2 Conflict of Laws 
As the title of this dissertation suggests, any convergence of two or more 
branches of law will inevitably cause some or other conflict between them. 
                                                             





The question which is relevant to this text is which branch of law triumphs 
above the other one. 
The Companies Act is the principal regulatory act in respect of company law 
in South Africa. As mentioned briefly above it regulates the formation of and 
affairs of existing companies in South Africa.  
The Companies act provides a mechanism for the removal of directors in its 
chapter dealing with directors.36 The act provides that irrespective of anything 
to the contrary contained in the articles of association, rules or any other 
agreement, a director may be removed from office by means of an ordinary 
resolution adopted at a shareholders meeting by the persons entitled to vote 
for the appointment of such director.37 
The Companies act provides certain conditions which must be met before a 
meeting as mentioned above may be called. The director must be informed 
of the meeting and the proposed resolution and must be afforded an 
opportunity to make a presentation before the resolution is voted on. It must 
be noted that the relevant section contains a disclaimer to the effect that the 
director who has so been removed still has a right to claim damages, whether 
in terms of the common law or otherwise, which he can prove was incurred 
as a result of the loss of office as a director or loss of any other office as a 
consequence of being removed as a director. 
In terms of the above it is quite clear that a director may easily be removed 
from the office of director. The conflict of laws comes into play when the 
director asserts that he is also an employee of the company in addition to the 
holder of the office of director.  
A lawful removal in accordance with the Companies Act may then be 
contested in the CCMA or Labour Court. In terms of the LRA an employee 
                                                             
36  S 71. 
37  It is interesting to note that a further requirement is that the resolution to remove the 
director may only be voted on by shareholders who were eligible to vote for the 
appointment of such a director. S 71(1) of the Companies Act states that a director 
may be removed only by 'the persons entitled to exercise voting rights, in an election 
of that director'. See in this regard Stoop, H The Company Director as Employee 
2011 32 ILJ 2367.. 
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may only be fairly dismissed on the grounds of misconduct, incapacity and/or 
the operational requirements of the employer. 
It is a well-known principle of labour law that lawfulness is not equated with 
fairness, last mentioned being the yardstick by which the CCMA and Labour 
Courts must measure the dismissals of employees.  
One of the more contentious issues in this regard concerns reinstatement 
orders issued under the auspices of the CCMA. It has been argued, and 
judicially stated that a Court or Tribunal cannot reinstate a dismissed director 
back into his office as a director once he has lawfully been removed from 
office in terms of the Companies Act. 
 
3. The Labour Relations Act 
The Labour Relations Act, as amended, is the cornerstone of our labour law 
jurisprudence. The LRA gives effect to the constitutionally enshrined right to 
fair labour practices. The LRA contains the prohibitions against unfair 
dismissals and governs the manner in which the CCMA and Labour Courts 
must adjudicate disputes relating to various labour matters. 
For purposes of completeness, certain sections of the LRA dealing with the 
question of whether or not directors may also be employees will be examined 
to ensure that an informed opinion may be developed once the law reports 
are analysed and a conclusion developed. 
3.1  Definition of Employee 
The definition of the term employee has been the cause of much contention 
in our labour law. According to the LRA38 an employee is defined as: 
(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for 
another person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, 
any remuneration; and; 
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(b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or 
conducting the business of an employer, and “employed” and “employment” 
have meanings corresponding to that of employee. 
The dissemination of this particular definition has been rehashed time and 
again in various legal journals and case law. For the purposes of brevity it 
needs merely to be elucidated that “…who works for another person…” can 
also refer to a juristic person and accordingly, the definition is sufficiently 
broad to include a director.  
It is interesting to note that the LRA further provides a presumption of 
employment.39 According to this presumption, regardless of the form of the 
contract between the parties a person who works or renders services to any 
other person is presumed to be an employee until the contrary has been 
proven.  
The section contains seven factors which must be considered when 
determining whether a person is an employee or not. One of the more 
relevant factors to this dissertation specifically lists “..in the case of a person 
who works for an organisation, the person forms part of that organisation”.40 
Whilst it may appear that the relevant subsection contains a logical fallacy in 
that it presumes that in the case of a person who works for an organisation, 
forms part of that organisation, it nonetheless provides sufficient scope to 
include a director in the definition of “employee”. The following subchapter 
will examine case law regarding the inclusion of a director under the 
definition of “employee”. 
It must however be mentioned that subsection 2 determines that the 
aforementioned criteria and presumption does not apply to people who earn 
in excess of the threshold amount as determined by the Minister of Labour 
from time to time.41 
                                                             
39   S 200A. 
40  S200A(1)(c). 
41  The threshold is R183,008.00. 
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It is interesting to note that South Africa is one of the few jurisdictions who do 
not differentiate between different groups of employees in its definition of 
employee. Many foreign labour law systems list and differentiate between 
categories workers such as employees, managerial staff and executives. 
3.2 Proposed amendments to the Labour Relations Act 
On the 14th of March 2012 proposed amendments to the Labour Relations 
Act 42  were submitted to the Cabinet by the Minister of Labour for 
consideration. The proposed amendments reflect a broad array of subject 
matter from temporary employment to the situation with Temporary 
Employment Servicers or, in more colloquial parlance, labour brokers. 
For purposes of this dissertation we need only investigate a proposed section 
188B to be inserted into the LRA. The relevant section regulates the 
termination of employees who earn above a certain remuneration 
threshold.43 
In terms of the proposed amendments an employer may lawfully and fairly 
dismiss an employee earning above the remuneration threshold as set by the 
Minister of Labour from time, if the employer has given the employee 
concerned a notice period of three months. Further requirements are that the 
employer pay the employee concerned compensation equal to three months’ 
notice should no notice have been given in advance. The subsection does 
also not apply should the dismissal be classified as an automatically unfair 
dismissal.44 
The new subsection also provides that it will apply retroactively to contracts 
of employment concluded prior to the inception of the amended provisions 
but only after a period of two years have elapsed since the entry into force. 
                                                             
42  Labour Relations Amendment Bill 2012. 




44  It is submitted that the inclusion of these requirements will undoubtedly lead to 
litigation as it provides ample opportunity for abuse.  
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The explanatory memorandum to the Labour Relations Amendment bill 45 
provides clarity on the purpose of the introduction of the subsection to the 
LRA and an extensive analysis of the “intention of the legislator” is deemed 
appropriate. 
From the onset it is stated that the purpose of the new section is to assist 
employers in dealing with the termination of high earning employees. It is 
imperative to quote certain key aspects of the memorandum in order to 
highlight the contentious nature the dismissal of executive employees; 
 
“At the heart of the change is the disproportionate cost, 
complexity, and impact on an employer’s operations of procedures 
to terminate the employment of high earning employees in 
circumstances where the reason for doing so may not fall clearly 
and neatly within the fair reasons for dismissal specified in section 
188(1)(a)(i) and (ii).” 
 
The legislature recognizes that there is a disproportionate cost and 
impact on the termination of senior executives. The legislature proceeds 
to deliver a rather obtusely written statement which in effect states that 
the subsection assists employers to dismiss senior employees for 
reasons “which may not fall clearly and neatly within the fair reasons for 
dismissal specified in section 188(1)(a)(i) and (ii). 
The legislature attempts to illustrate its ill-conceived statement by 
providing the example of a company which wishes to introduce a new 
executive with a different managerial style or culture because the 
incumbent employee no longer fits the corporate culture of the 
company.  
Firstly, it must be stated that the LRA specifically provides that a 
dismissal which is not automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails 
to prove that the reason for the dismissal is a fair reason related to the 
employees (i) conductor capacity or (ii) based on the employer’s 





operational requirements.46 The LRA does not provide for the provision 
of “other” fair reasons for dismissal whether they fall neatly and clearly 
within the LRA or not. 
Dismissal on the grounds of misconduct, incapacity and operational 
requirements are the only grounds upon which a dismissal may be 
found to be for a fair reason. This has been the cornerstone of the 
unfair dismissal jurisprudence of the Republic of South Africa for two 
decades. 
Secondly, the scenario proffered by the legislature can quite easily be 
resolved by reference to existing case law. The problems identified by 
the legislature fall squarely within the principles of incompatibility which 
has been found to be a sub-element of incapacity, which in turn, is one 
of the reasons listed in the LRA which may constitute a fair reason for 
dismissal.47 
The legislature proceeds to recognise that the application of section 188 
of the LRA an especially onerous task to perform at the upper levels of 
the corporate ladder. It is also recognised that there are significant 
costs involved with performance management and discipline at the top 
level of employment in the company. 
It is then explained that the primary rationale for protective labour law 
relates to an inequality in bargaining power. The legislature states that: 
 
“Providing uniform protection against unfair dismissal to lower 
skilled or lower paid employees, on the one hand, and highly 
skilled or highly paid executives, on the other, fails to recognise 
the significant difference in bargaining power that employees in 
these categories have in negotiating employment contracts and in 
dealing with their employers during employment.” 
 
                                                             
46  Section 188(1)(i) & (ii) 




The abovementioned statement is the founding argument for the 
movement against classifying executives as employees. The argument 
was first used in the 1980’s and readily appears in the numerous law 
reports discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
The legislature further states that it has analysed the labour law of 
comparable legal systems which specifically exclude executives or top-
tier employees from dismissal protection. The selection criteria 
employed by section 188B is on the basis of a threshold amount as 
opposed to by reference to the status or role of the employee. The 
memorandum states that “this approach will avoid the need for disputes 
about whether employees fall inside or outside an identified class of 
employee that may give rise to costly collateral litigation.” 
It is humbly submitted that the proposed amendment by way of the 
implementation of section 188B is a far cry from a proper resolution to 
the thorny and loaded question of executive dismissals and the 
concomitant effect thereof on commercial law. On the one end of the 
scale the legislature has given appreciation to the fact that executive 
dismissals are sui generis and different from “regular” dismissals in 
complexity, style and approach.  
On the other hand the legislature does not intervene to properly identify 
and separate the legal principles one and for all – it merely provides a 
mechanism where employees can throw money at the problem to make 
it go away.  
The memorandum ends the commentary on this section of the 
amendment bill by stating that its vision is that the proposed 
amendment will serve as a balance between the company’s 
requirement to swiftly dispose of issues at its top managerial level and 
the rights and interest of highly paid employees who “remain protected 
against arbitrary or summary action”. 
The most basic deficiency in the approach adopted by the legislature is 
found in the fact that many companies cannot afford, whether by fiscal 
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issues or time related exigencies, to provide executives with three 
months’ notice or compensation. A proper law reform based on 
principles rather than an easily applied mechanism would ensure 
fairness for the parties concerned.  
The primary objective of a law reform process is to bring the law in line 
with changing values and changing environments. It is humbly 
submitted that a principle-based approach is to be preferred above the 
utilization of a simple mechanism which does not fully consolidate the 
relevant legal principles. 
The memorandum’s reasons for the proposed amendment to the LRA 
confirm the argument that senior executives are a special type of 
employee (if they are indeed employees for that matter). If there had 
been no need to develop the law applicable to the dismissal of 
executives it would not have featured in such depth in the amendment 
bill.  
South African labour law has identified various types of employees 
which form part of especially vulnerable groups such as domestic 
workers 48 , security personnel 49  and farm workers 50 . It is humbly 
submitted that the sectoral determinations applicable to the 
aforementioned groups of employees in practice differentiate between 
different types of employees. It is submitted that a differentiation 
between regular employees and “executive employees” would not be 
perverse as the sectoral determinations already distinguish between 
various groups of employees. 
The basis on which the distinction would apply would not be 
vulnerability but the exact opposite thereof. It is not argued that a 
sectoral determination should be made to apply to executive employees 
yet merely illustrates that our labour law implicitly provides for 
differentiation between employees. 
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49  Sectoral Determination 6. 
50  Sectoral Determination 13. 
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Despite the aforementioned criticism of the proposed amendments to 
the LRA it can be accepted that it is a step in the right direction. It is 
likely that the final version of Section 188B will differ slightly in 
appearance from the draft proposed in the 2012 version of the 
Amendment Bill.  
It is submitted that as the development of the internet and the digital 
age progresses (ever more rapidly) the changing face of business will 
force the Law Reform Commission to re-evaluate its position on section 
188B when it enters into force. As technology advances the Directors 
on the Boards they serve must ensure that they are adequately 
acquainted with the developments as they are responsible for the long 
term vision and strategy of the company. The need to restructure and 
change direction will be faster than ever before and it is vital that labour 
law evolves accordingly to remain relevant. 
 3.3 Case Law 
3.3.1 Stevenson v Sterns Jewellers (Pty) Ltd 
The judgment of Stevenson v Sterns Jewellers (Pty) Ltd51 in the Industrial 
Court before Fabricius (as he then was) is the earliest recorded judgment 
involving the alleged unfair dismissal of a director. The arguments contain 
therein feature prominently in the ensuing law reports. It is quite unfortunate 
that the very first case to ask the question of whether or not a director may 
also be an employee was decided prior to the promulgation of the LRA. 
The Applicant (“Stevenson”) was the managing director of the Sterns 
Jewellers (Pty) Ltd. Barely three weeks after his employment he was 
dismissed under the auspices of what can best be described as 
incompatibility due to his “managerial style”. Stevenson petitioned the 
Industrial Court to find that his dismissal was procedurally and substantively 
unfair specifically due to the absence of a proper hearing.  
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The Respondent countered his petition by arguing that Stevenson was 
employed as an executive and not a “mere unit of labour”. It must be 
mentioned that Stevenson was employed as a “title director” and had not yet 
been appointed to the board in line with the statutory requirements of the 
Companies Act.  
During the proceedings it emerged that Stevenson had been informed of 
allegations of poor conduct and attitude towards the staff of the Respondent 
company. Mr Barnett, the Chief Executive Officer of the group cautioned the 
Applicant whereupon the Applicant indicated that in his new position he 
would undoubtedly upset people as he was employed to change the status 
quo. 
The Respondent indicated that continued employment of the Applicant would 
be unsustainable and cited his relationship with the other directors as one of 
the causes for the unsustainability. 
The Respondent further argued that Stevenson, in his position of managing 
director, is not considered a mere unit of labour. It was argued that the 
position he occupied was a personal one and the management of the top tier 
of the company is imperative for its continued success. It was specifically 
argued that his “dismissal” was substantively fair. 
Counsel for the Respondent argued that an order for reinstatement would 
force a managing director upon a company which would be harmful to the 
company, that the Applicant could not be reinstated as a director, that the 
company has paid to the Applicant three month’s salary, 
The Court expressed its displeasure at the term of “mere unit of labour” and 
declined to classify employees. The Court did not accept the Respondent’s 
argument that the Applicant was not a mere unit of labour.  
In a rather startling judgment the Court dismisses the application. The Court 
did not base its finding on the concept of a misconduct hearing but rather 




Despite the Court’s finding which effectively recognises the Applicant as an 
“employee” and rejects the notion of a managing director being a “mere unit 
of labour” the Court, with all due respect, proceeds to depart from the regular 
adjudication of procedural and substantive fairness and bases its judgment 
on the “equities” of the case. 
This despite the fact that it was common cause that no disciplinary hearing 
was held, there was no compliance with the common law requirement of audi 
alteram partem and that the Court factually accepted that the Applicant was 
an employee of the company and thus entitled to the protection of the statute.  
There appears to be sufficient and convincing evidence from the Respondent 
that there was sufficient grounds for dismissing the Applicant due to 
incapacity, specifically incompatibility, but this does not excuse the fact that 
the dismissal was at the very least procedurally unfair and devoid of merit. 
The acclaimed jurist, M P Larkin, in commentary on the judgment asks the 
question why “ordinary directors” as mentioned in the judgment, may not also 
be considered to employees as the definition of employee contained in the 
LRA is exceedingly wide.52 
Larkin reviewed the matter of R v Mall53 where it was stated that: 
'There is a material difference between the situation of a director 
and that of a manager.  Directors are required by statute; they are 
essential to a company, and their functions and duties are defined 
by law.  They are appointed by the shareholders and are vested 
with the management and control of the company.  They represent 
the company, and there is a degree of permanence attaching to 
their position.  They act as a body save so far as powers are 
lawfully delegated.  Their identity, the law intends, should be 
undoubted and easily discoverable from the company's records.' 
 
In referring to the abovementioned passage in R v Mall, Larkin criticizes the 
contention that solely due to the fact that directors are mandated by statute to 
perform the duties of their office in the interests of the company they are to 
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53  1959 4 SA  607 (D). 
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be considered distinct from employees. Larkin draws the parallel to an 
Atomic Power Station where certain people would be mandated by statute to 
perform duties there (an example would be a safety officer), the law does not 
exclude these workers from the definition of employee so why should it do so 
with ordinary directors. 
The question is then asked if a written contract of employment is required to 
establish that an ordinary director is also an employee. Inversely, Larkin 
questions whether such a contract of employment is a bar to the 
acknowledgement of the ordinary director’s status as an employee. The 
answer to this question is in the negative when one has regard to the wide 
ambit of the definition of employee in the LRA. 
 
3.3.2 Brown v Oak Industries54 
The Applicant in casu found himself in a rather precarious situation. He was 
appointed as managing director of the respondent company in 1984. In 1985 
the Respondent company (which at the time was owned and operated by a 
North-American Company) was acquired by a listed South African company. 
A director of the listed company which acquired the Respondent company 
(“hereafter the Respondent company”) was appointed to the Board of 
Directors and occupied the position of chairman.  
The gist of the law report concerns the Respondent company’s denial that 
the Applicant was validly appointed as managing director of the Respondent 
company. The Respondent sought to argue that the Applicant’s petition to the 
Industrial Court was ill-fated on the grounds that, as a director of the 
Respondent company, the applicant did not fall within the scope of the 
meaning afforded to “director” under the previous LRA.55 
The Respondent further argued that the actual dispute was one of 
shareholding and, concomitantly, a dispute between the shareholders which 
is to be adjudicated in a civil court in terms of company law as opposed to a 
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specialist tribunal applying labour law principles. In its pleadings before the 
Court the Respondent admitted that it considered the Applicant to be the 
managing director of the company, albeit as a result of laxity on the part of 
the Respondent. 
The Respondent argued, and rather convincingly at that, that the LRA did not 
apply to the Applicant as director of the company. They argued that a director 
is not an employee as a director is appointed by vote at a general meeting of 
the shareholders of the Company and not employed by the Company in the 
traditional sense. 
The Respondent referred to the “control-test” and specifically sought to 
illustrate that the shareholders have no explicit right to control of the director 
during the day to day functioning of the business. The Board of Directors are 
accountable to the shareholders of the company at a general or extraordinary 
meeting of shareholders and it is their duty to manage the day to day affairs 
of the company as they see fit. 
Despite the Respondent’s argument the Applicant referred to the definition of 
“employee” in the LRA, specifically the section referring to “any other person 
whomsoever who in any manner assists in the carrying on or conducting of 
the business of an employer” as authority for the proposition that the director 
was indeed an employee in terms of the LRA.56 
Given the sufficiently wide ambit of the definition the Court had no problem in 
accepting that as a director contributed to the carrying on of the business that 
a director would indeed fall within the scope of the definition if it can be 
factually proven that the director was involved with the day to day 
management of the company and performed duties which would also be 
performed by employees in the ordinary course of business. 
The Court sought to differentiate between the various different forms a 
directorship might take.57 The Court took cognisance of the fact that there 
might very well be directors which fall within the scope of the definition as 
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provided by the Respondent, that these directors were merely appointed by 
the shareholders and occupied no specific role nor were they subject to the 
exercise of control. The Court accepted that the LRA would not apply to 
directors in the aforementioned class.  
The Court in casu specifically ruled that non-executive directors or so-called 
“professional directors” who merely act in an advisory capacity on the Board 
of Directors’ of the Company would not be considered to be employees of 
that company. These directors’ are paid a director’s fee and do not apply for 
leave nor have specific hours of work which they must adhere to. 
The Court further identified directors who are first and foremost employees of 
the company subject to the control of more senior directors or managers. 58 
The Court pointed out that this specific approach was not incompatible to 
prior case law such as the Stevenson case above. 
The Court noted that the Respondent cannot have its case both ways; it 
either acknowledges that the Applicant was just a director, reporting to no 
one with his core focus on his duties of care, skill and diligence or he was a 
subordinate and had to comply with lawful commands given by his superior.  
Based on the pleadings as they stood and, without the benefit of hearing viva 
voce evidence the Court concluded that the Applicant fell into the category of 
directors who in addition to being office bearers of the company were also 
employees at the same time.  
The Court examined various alleged breaches of the conditions of service 
between the Applicant and Respondent and ultimately ordered that the 
Respondent reinstate the applicant in its employment “on terms and 
conditions not less favourable to him” in accordance with the principles of the 
LRA. 
The Court in casu sought to deal more extensively with the question of 
whether or not a director can be considered an employee of the company 
than the Court in the Stevenson case. In effect the Court is required to 
                                                             




examine the true relationship inter partes in order to establish whether or not 
the director concerned is merely an office bearer or an employee at the same 
time.  
An interesting question which the Court sought to avoid was the position 
regarding reinstatement orders of directors and executives. The Court’s order 
did not state that the Applicant must be reinstated as managing director of 
the Respondent but merely that he must be re-employed on terms and 
conditions not less favourable than those governing the relationship between 
immediately before his dismissal. 
While the argument has been made that it is not for a Court to force the 
shareholders of the Company to call a general meeting and vote on a 
resolution to re-appoint a dismissed director to his former office it still begs 
the question what are terms not less favourable? 
Surely the position and title of director is one of much esteem and pride for 
the vast majority of executives. There are certain agreements and actions 
which may only be authorised by directors and it is doubtful whether a 
dismissed director returning to his position without his title and appointment 
of office in terms of the Companies Act is allowed to action such decisions. 
The title and status of “director” is an important factor in the business 
networking- and marketing sphere were the executives are required to meet 
with their peers for the joint benefit of both companies.  
Practical implications aside, the dismissed director’s own sense of worth and 
job satisfaction will be hampered by the fact that he is no longer a “true” 
statutory director and formally appointed to this office. I verily believe that an 
argument can be constructed that not being afforded a formal appointment to 
his office does indeed constitute terms which are on the whole less 
favourable than those which were applicable prior to the unfair dismissal. The 




3.3.3 Hydraulic Engineering Repair Services v Ntshona & Others59 
The present case involves a review application in the Labour Court against a 
jurisdictional ruling in the CCMA confirming that the Respondent before the 
Labour Court was an employee and that the CCMA accordingly had 
jurisdiction to hear the Respondent’s (Applicant in the CCMA) alleged unfair 
dismissal matter. 
Mr Page was the only shareholder in the Company and also acted as its 
Managing Director. Sometime in 2003 Mr Page recruited the services of Mr 
Ntshona to work as its Marketing Director. The facts listed by the court in the 
law report does not identify nor state whether Mr Ntshona was appointed as 
a statutory director. 
A sale of shares agreement was drafted by the Company in terms of which 
Mr Ntshona would acquire 50 % shares of the company by means of a 
deferred payment scheme wherein Ntshona would pay R150 000 over five 
years or R75 000 over a period of 10 years to acquire the shares.  
The parties furthermore agreed to a binding shareholders agreement which, 
although unsigned, they agreed regulated the relationship between them. 
The shareholders agreement contained clauses which, inter alia, designated 
Ntshona as the marketing director, listed his duties in accordance with the 
aforesaid designation and contained the particulars of his remuneration. 
During the tail end of 2003 the managing director of the Company addressed 
a letter to Ntshona advising him to resign from the office of director, failing 
which he will be removed as director. The letter cited various reasons for the 
request, principally, Ntshona’s failure to “advance the Company”. 
The Applicant argued that the de facto position was that the parties were 
partners in a partnership which was used as a vessel to facilitate the 
business relationship between them. As a result of the partnership it would 
be impossible for the Respondent to be both an employer and employee at 
the same time. 
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It was further argued by the Applicant’s counsel that as the parties were 
partners in a partnership both were jointly responsible for the actions of the 
partnership and that a “lawful dismissal” could only take place if both partners 
consented. According to the Applicant this absurd state of affairs would mean 
that the dismissed partner is suing his own partnership and, as he himself is 
a partner jointly responsible for the management of the affairs of the 
partnership, he would have to sue himself. The Applicant also illustrated that 
the Respondent never relinquished any rights as a partner and was 
accordingly jointly responsible for the decision making process.  
In its assessment of the facts of the case the Labour Court examined the 
definition of “employee” in the LRA.60 The Labour Court further relied upon 
the ratio decidendi of the court in PG Group (Pty) Ltd v Mbambo61 where it 
was held that a director is not necessarily precluded from also being an 
employee of a Company. 
The Court restated the well-established legal principle that when the parties 
agree on a contract between them which seeks to regulate or categorize the 
relationship inter partes as being something other than one of employment, 
such a contract is not the only factor which must be taken into account to 
determine the true relationship inter partes. The Court is entitled to 
investigate the true relationship between the parties and in doing so must 
seek to examine the substance thereof as opposed to form.62 
The Court proceeded to apply the so called ”dominant impression test63. In 
applying the aforementioned test the Court must analyse the relationship 
between the parties in toto, identifying aspects which indicate a contract of 
employment and aspects which indicate a contract of service. Once these 
factors have been listed, attached appropriate weight and due consideration 
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has been given the Court is in a position to determine the type of relationship 
inter partes. 
The Court found that the Applicant had remained in control of the operations 
of the Company and that the reason the Respondent was not afforded equal 
power and control was to protect the interests of the Applicant. The Court 
found that the mere fact that a party had ownership rights in a business did 
not render them unable to be regarded as an employee. 
The Court laid particular emphasis on the fact that the Respondent was paid 
a salary by the company, that UIF and other statutory deductions were 
applied to the Respondents payslip and that the Company paid for the 
medical aid of the Respondent. The evidence before the Court indicated that 
the Respondent was obliged to oversee and manage the operations of the 
sales team and was expected to be an integral part in the daily activities of 
the company in respect of marketing and sales. The Court specifically stated 
that the Respondent was not solely responsible for duties which fell squarely 
within the executive sphere of management. 
The Court accordingly found that the relationship between the Respondent 
and that of the Company was indeed one of employment and that the 
Respondent was both a director and employee at the same time. The Court 
ordered that the matter be remitted to the CCMA for arbitration. 
The Applicant’s defence was premised in the assumption that the 
Respondent was not an employee however it differs from those similar 
arguments raised in the aforementioned cases discussed above. The 
Applicant argues that the actual relationship between the parties was a 
“partnership” and a partner cannot be an owner and employee at the same 
time.  
The Applicant argued that the Respondent had not signed away his rights as 
partner and a “dismissal” in the narrow sense could not have occurred as a 
partner could not dismiss himself (an action which would be necessary for a 
lawful dismissal where both partners have equal rights).  
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It appears as though the litigating parties have moved away from the notion 
that a director is not an employee based solely on the fact that there is 
normally not an uneven distribution of power between the parties and the 
Company. The Applicant in this case went particularly far in devising a 
“partnership” as the vessel within which they conducted their business 
activities. 
Whilst it may appear at first glance that the Applicant’s counsel devised a far-
fetched scenario in order to attempt to argue his way out of the protective 
provisions of the LRA it is humbly submitted that the difficulties mentioned 
above are germane to executive dismissals and provide a distinctly different 
problem for companies when contemplating a shuffle of the executive 
management of the company. The litany of cases with various degrees of 
arguments against the inclusion of directors under the status of employees is 
indicative of the fact that a law reform process would be a welcome change 
to the law. 
3.3.4  South African Post Office Ltd v Khutso Mampeule64 
This matter came before the Labour Appeal Court by virtue of the dismissal 
of the Appellant’s application for a declaratory order that the Respondent’s 
automatic termination did not fall under the definition of dismissal in terms of 
the LRA. 
The Appellant (the South African Post Office Ltd) is a government company 
with the Government of the Republic of South Africa as its only shareholder. 
The Appellant was represented by the Minister of Communication in his 
official capacity. 
The Respondent was appointed as the Managing Director of the Appellant on 
30 October 2005, the aforesaid contract entering into force on the 20th of 
June 2005. The contract was for a fixed term of five years and, upon his 
appointment as Managing Director, automatically appointed the Respondent 
as an executive director on the Appellant’s board. 
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The Appellant’s articles of association determined that an executive director 
may only be appointed for a period of five years and also provided that it was 
a requirement of an “executive director’s employment“ that he holds the office 
of director. The articles of association further determined that if the executive 
director ceases to hold the office of director for any reason that his 
employment would automatically terminate at the same time. It was this 
automatic termination clause in the articles of association between the 
parties which formed the basis for much contention and argument before the 
Court. 
During the first half of 2007 the Respondent received a letter from the 
Minister of Communication, acting on behalf of the shareholders of the 
Appellant, which letter removed the Respondent from the office of director. 
The letter further advised the Respondent that his employment relationship 
with the Appellant was terminated concurrently with his removal as director 
as per the articles of association of the company. 
The Court referred to the articles of association which further provided (and 
was attached as an annexure to the Respondent’s contract of employment). 
The executives of the Appellant’s board were bound by the terms and 
conditions contained in the articles of association. The articles provided that 
the directors would be appointed for a maximum period of five years yet 
made provision for the early termination thereof on the grounds of incapacity, 
poor work performance, misconduct or operational requirements. It is clear 
that the reasons for which the contract may be terminated prior to the expiry 
thereof are the same as the grounds in the LRA upon which an employer 
may lawfully dismiss an employee.65 
The articles also affirmed that should the contract of employment be 
terminated before the five year period has expired that fair labour practices 
would be a factor in the equation. The Labour Court, with reference to the 
abovementioned, found that the automatic termination clause the Appellant 
relied on curtailed the right to fair labour practices and effectively amounted 
to contracting out of the LRA. The Labour Court also expressed its concern 
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that creating a precedent could pave the way for a slippery slope whereby 
employers could contract out of the LRA. 
On the legal question pertaining to whether or not the Respondent was 
dismissed by virtue of the automatic termination clause the Labour Court held 
that any act which directly or indirectly terminates the employment contact 
falls squarely within the scope of the definition of “dismissal” as defined in the 
LRA. 
The Appellant’s counsel sought to prove its case by attacking the legal and 
factual causation of the Respondent’s dismissal. The argument was further 
advanced that the automatic termination clause was a novus actus interviens 
which had the effect of establishing that the removal as director was not the 
proximate cause of the termination of the Respondent’s contract of 
employment. The Appellant also disputed that it was the entity that removed 
the Respondent from office. 
The Appellant argued that the decision to remove the Respondent from the 
office of director was done in accordance with company law, with the Minister 
of Communication acting on behalf of the shareholders as the ultimate 
owners and controllers of the enterprise. The argument went further that 
shareholders have no relationship with the employees in terms of labour law 
and operate solely on the plane of commercial law. The Court held that the 
decision of the shareholders of a company is effectively the decision of the 
company. 
The gist of the Appellant’s argument was that the termination of the 
Respondent’s employment was merely the knock on effect of the Minister’s 
issuing of the resolution removing the Respondent as a director. It was not 
the act which terminated his employment. His employment was terminated as 




The Respondent’s counsel not surprisingly argued that the automatic 
termination clause was abhorrent and contrary to the prohibition on the 
limitation of statutory rights found in the opening chapters of the LRA. 66 
The LAC proceeded to review the definition of “dismissal” in the LRA and 
stated that dismissal means “any act by an employer which results, directly or 
indirectly in the termination of an employment contract” (own emphasis). The 
Court acknowledged that the Respondent’s removal was premised on the 
removal sections found in the Companies Act which have already been dealt 
with in detail elsewhere and shall not be repeated here.67  
The Court was referred to the matter of NULAW v Barnard N.O and 
Another 68. In NULAW the question which the LAC was called upon to answer 
revolved around the issue of causation. The shareholders of the employer 
company passed a unanimous vote to voluntarily wind-up the company and 
the cardinal issue before the Court was whether or not this constituted a 
dismissal in terms of the LRA. The LAC held that due to the fact that the 
shareholders passed the resolution to set the process in motion that it was 
indeed sufficient to constitute a dismissal. It accordingly fell within the ambit 
of “any act by the employer”. 
However, the Court also compared the hypothetical scenario of a compulsory 
winding up and found that this would not constitute a dismissal as the Court’s 
intervention broke the chain of causation. The compulsory winding up 
application brought by a creditor of the company would be an external action 
and would not amount to the company terminating the services of an 
employee. 
The Respondent sought to rely on NULAW to prove that a resolution passed 
by shareholders could indeed constitute a dismissal in terms of the LRA. The 
Court took cognisance that to find that a shareholder’s act of removal in 
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terms of the Companies Act could render shareholder rights nugatory and 
ineffective.  
The LAC held that a managing director is the holder of two positions in the 
company should this be factually proven; both director and employee. The 
fact that the Respondent’s duration of tenure could be ended prematurely as 
a result of misconduct, incapacity or operational requirements served to 
confirm that he was indeed regarded as an employee of the Appellant. 
The LAC restated the well-known principle that in labour law lawfulness 
cannot be equated with fairness. 69  The Court accordingly dismissed the 
appeal with costs. 
3.3.5 PG Group (Pty) Ltd v Mbambo N.O. and Others70 
The abovementioned case concerns a review application in the Labour Court 
against a jurisdictional ruling conducted by a commissioner under the 
auspices of the CCMA. The Third Respondent (hereafter the Respondent) in 
casu was appointed as the Financial Director of the Applicant company, PG 
Group. 
It is important for purposes of this matter to elucidate that the sole 
shareholder of PG Group was a holding company named PGSI. During 2003 
the Respondent received a notice in terms of the Applicant’s articles of 
association which had the effect of requiring him to vacate his office of 
director. Subsequent to this termination the Respondent filed an unfair 
dismissal claim at the CCMA. 
At the CCMA hearing the Applicant raised a point in limine that the CCMA 
could not hear the matter as the Respondent was not dismissed. It sought to 
argue that the notice terminating his directorship was in accordance with the 
articles of association. The Applicant clearly attempted to separate labour 
from company law. 
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The CCMA dismissed the point in limine and found that it did indeed have 
jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The main ground of review persisted in 
proceedings before the Court was that the CCMA commissioner failed to 
apply their mind to the cogent issues in dispute, namely, that the Respondent 
had not been dismissed by the Applicant. 
The interesting argument raised in this case is that the Applicant did not wish 
to dismiss the Respondent and neither did it set in motion the mechanism for 
their dismissal. The Applicants holding company, PGSI, in terms of their right 
as sole shareholder and in terms of the articles of association of the 
Applicant caused the termination notice to be sent to the Respondent. 
Evidence was however lead which revealed that prior to the Respondents 
dismissal the Applicant attempted to retrench the Respondent. The 
operational requirements dismissal procedure was not persisted in. 
The Applicant’s counsel argued that the commissioner failed to apply their 
mind to the point in limine by failing to understand the “unique relationship” 
between the Respondent, the Applicant and its holding company, PGSI. The 
Applicant argued that PGSI was entitled to terminate the Respondent’s office 
by a vote in terms of its articles of association and this decision need not be 
in the best interests of the Applicant as a shareholder does not owe the 
company the same duties of care, skill and diligence a director does.  
The Applicant also sought to argue that such a vote taken at a meeting of 
shareholders does not necessarily bind the Applicant. The decision to 
terminate the directorship of the Respondent was taken by PGSI and not the 
Applicant. 71  The Applicant also argued that the Respondent was not 
employed by the Applicant but rather appointed by the shareholders. 
The Applicant’s counsel invoked the doctrine of supervening impossibility of 
performance and argued that the Respondent’s contract was terminated by 
operation of law and this does not constitute a dismissal as required by the 
LRA to trigger jurisdiction. 
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The Court examined the applicable company law principles and specifically 
stated that the Companies Act, its own articles of association and the 
common law regulate the distribution of power in a company. 
The Court examined the provisions of the Companies Act in terms of which a 
director may be removed from office72. In terms of the aforementioned the 
shareholders of a company may remove a director before his term of office 
expires by exercising a vote by extraordinary resolution. The Respondent’s 
counsel argued that in such a case the shareholders decision ultimately 
binds the company and becomes the company’s decision. 
The Applicants articles of association determined that should shareholders 
who were entitled to vote at a general meeting make a decision such 
decision shall be deemed to have been made at a general meeting. A 
teleconference was held where it was collectively approved to terminate the 
Respondent’s office of directorship.  
The Respondent argued that, as per the Applicants articles of association, 
the decision was taken by members at a general meeting. This had the effect 
that it was actually the decision of the Applicant and not PGSI. The Applicant 
referred to the well-known rule of attribution in that the shareholder’s decision 
taken at a general meeting was considered to be the company’s decision. 
The Court found without hesitation that the Applicant had indeed made and 
taken the decision to terminate the Respondent’s office. The second leg of 
the enquiry which the Court had to pronounce on was whether or not the 
Respondent was to be afforded the protection of the LRA. 
The Applicant’s counsel, Martin Brassey (as he then was), argued that the 
earlier cases concluded in the Industrial Court regarding executives and the 
protections against unfair dismissals were not properly considered and 
needed to be revisited. 
The Court took cognizance of the fact that the raisson d’ être of the LRA and 
its precursors is to protect ordinary workers against the commercial power 
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and might which their employers inevitably wield against them. The Court 
found support for this notion in the many requirements the LRA lays down in 
respect to retrenchments, unions and collective bargaining.  
The Court restated the principles enshrined in Stevenson supra, that 
directors hold two positions in the company they serve; one as employee and 
one as an office bearer. The Court found that it has consistently been held 
that whether or not a director is an employee is a factual enquiry and that 
there is no valid reason to preclude a director who is also an employee from 
the protection from unfair dismissal mechanisms in the LRA. 
The Court ultimately found that the decision to dismiss the director was taken 
by the Applicant and that the respondent was also an employee in addition to 
the office he held. The matter was remitted to the CCMA for arbitration. 
3.3.6 Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Turnbull73 
The Respondent in this matter was appointed as the Appellant’s financial 
director as a result of good work performance in prior years as the company’s 
financial manager which subsequently led to the Respondent’s promotion 
within the ranks of the company. When the economic climate started 
deteriorating the Respondent sought to resign from the office of director and 
reclaim her previous position as financial manager. 
When the Respondent tendered her resignation from the Board of Directors it 
was accepted by the company and the Respondent was advised not to return 
to work as she was only appointed as a director and her resignation 
terminated the relationship between herself and the company. 
The Respondent accordingly lodged an unfair dismissal claim and during 
arbitration the Arbitrator found that she was indeed unfairly dismissed and 
awarded her compensation. Aggrieved by this ruling the Appellant sought to 
review the award in the Labour Court but the review application was 
dismissed. This appeal is against the dismissal of the review application in 
the Labour Court. 
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The Court stated that when a person is appointed as a director without an 
agreement reflecting the appointment then the position will be regulated by 
the company’s articles of association. The Court stated that strictly speaking 
a director is not an employee of the company but the same individual can be 
an employee and director at the same time should this be factually proven 
before the court. The court took cognisance of prior case law in this regard, 
specifically the locus classicus, Stevenson v Sterns discussed earlier in this 
chapter. 
The Court was of the opinion that the matter could be resolved without 
detailed reference to legal principles and doctrine as the Respondent had 
clearly set out in her resignation from the office of director that she was only 
stepping down from the office of director and did not wish to terminate the 
employment relationship between herself and the Company. 
The Court stated that a notice to resign must be clear and unequivocal in 
order to be legally sound. The Court found that the Respondent had never 
had the intention to terminate the employment relationship between herself 
and the company. 
The Appellant argued that the Respondent only held one position in the 
company and that she was only appointed as its financial director. The 
Appellant was of the opinion that when the Respondent resigned she could 
only resign from the one position she held at the company. 
The Appellant sought to argue that the Respondent’s previous position as 
internal accountant fell away when she was given a substantial increase to 
her remuneration. There was correspondence between the parties indicating 
that there was an intention to have a new contract drafted subsequent to her 
appointment to the board of directors. 
The Court examined various court cases and academic articles and gave 
credence to the approach adopted by the Courts before it.74 The Court found 
that a director is not an employee but the holder of fiduciary duties in respect 
of an office of a private company. This must be tempered by the fact that the 
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Court stated there is no reason why a director may not also be an employee 
of the company.  
In formulating its judgment the Court emphasised that litigation involving 
directors as employees was not a novel concept. The Court found that the 
appeal may be dismissed by simply scrutinising the Respondent’s “letter of 
resignation”. The Court held that it was abundantly clear that the Respondent 
had the intention of only resigning from the office of director and not also as 
an employee of the company. The Respondent confirmed that she would still 
be committed to the company and would perform her duties with the same 
vigour and skill.  
The Court accepted the Respondent’s argument that the Appellant had been 
opportunistic in attempting to utilise the Respondent’s resignation from office 
as a resignation from the employment of the Company.  
An important element of the judgment of the Labour Appeal Court is that it 
essentially confirms that a director may resign from office and demand to 
continue working in the position he held (or perhaps still holds as employee 
depending on the philosophy one wishes to apply). This is of critical 
importance as the articles of association of many companies’ determine that 
it must keep a minimum number of directors on its board.  
The South African private sector is filled with small to medium sized 
companies which cannot afford to employ new directors while having 
directors which resigned from office yet demand to remain employees of the 
company. The aftermath of such a decision will normally result in inevitable 
litigation as the company’s only option is to terminate the employment of the 
director in compliance with the prescripts of the LRA and in terms of the 
lawful reasons for termination. 
It is submitted that a company would be able to prove that it is an operational 
requirement to appoint a new director and the only manner in which to do 
that would be retrench the director who resigned. The Company would still 
need to be able to prove that it had valid operational requirements for 
49 
 
effecting the dismissal and that its criteria for selecting those to be retrenched 
must be fair and objective. 
It is abundantly clear that the challenge posed by a director resigning from 
office yet intending to stay on as an employee causes a number of problems 
for the company concerned. The procedure which must then be adopted is 
unnecessarily cumbersome, costly and time consuming.  
3.3.7 Chillibush Communications (Pty) Ltd v Johnston N.O. and 
Others75 
This was an application by the Applicant to set aside and review a 
jurisdictional ruling of the CCMA in terms whereof the CCMA found that the 
Third Respondent (hereafter the Respondent) was an employee of the 
Applicant, entitled to lodge a claim of unfair dismissal irrespective of the fact 
that he was a director. 
The Respondent was appointed as the “managing creative director” of the 
Applicant. The Respondent filed an unfair dismissal application with the 
CCMA in early 2007. As in earlier cases dealing with the unfair dismissal 
applications by executives the Applicant (the Respondent before the CCMA) 
raised a point in limine that the CCMA did not have jurisdiction to hear the 
matter as the Respondent was not dismissed by the Applicant and that the 
Respondent was accordingly not an employee of the Applicant. 
The CCMA dismissed the point in limine and ruled that the Respondent was 
indeed an employee and that the CCMA had jurisdiction to hear the 
application. The matter was scheduled for arbitration before a different 
commissioner and at the onset thereof, by agreement by all parties, it was 
agreed that the commissioner would only determine two issues; was the 
Respondent an employee and, was he dismissed by the Applicant. 
The parties at the arbitration did not inform the arbitrating commissioner 
(Johnston) of the prior jurisdictional ruling. The parties led evidence on 
whether or not the Respondent was an employee of the Applicant. In the 
                                                             
75  2010 31 ILJ 1358 (LC). 
50 
 
interim Johnston was informed that the Respondent was already found to be 
an employee of the Applicant in the jurisdictional ruling. Johnston berated the 
parties and ruled that the matter was to be set down de novo solely for the 
determination of whether the Respondent was unfairly dismissed. The parties 
argued that the jurisdictional ruling was made before conciliation and that it 
was not conclusive of the fact that the Respondent was an employee in the 
arbitration proceedings which were distinct from the in limine hearing. The 
present application concerns a review of this ruling. 
The Labour Court held that the aforementioned ruling was patently 
reviewable and that it had sufficient evidence before it to issue a judgment on 
the matter thus rendering the remittance of the matter back to the CCMA for 
a hearing de novo superfluous. The Court proceeded to analyze the evidence 
and heads of argument before it. 
The Respondent was employed as managing creative director on 5 April 
2006 and, in terms of a shareholders’ agreement, held 20% shares of the 
Applicant. A point of cardinal importance was that the shareholders 
agreement determined that should a shareholder cease to be a director of 
the company or have his employment terminated, by his own resignation or 
acts of the other shareholders, which must be approved by the chairperson of 
the board, the shareholder would be obliged to resign as director and offer to 
sell his shares. The shareholders agreement did not provide for an automatic 
termination as the articles of association did in Mampheule supra but merely 
mandated that the director would be required to resign. 
On 14 November 2006, two other directors of the Applicant, Dlamini and 
Hefer, convened a meeting of shareholders to be held on 7 December 2006. 
On 7 December 2006 the Respondent’s attorneys conveyed a letter to the 
Applicant cancelling the shareholders agreement, tendering his 20% shares, 
indicating that the Respondent did not consider the shareholders agreement 
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binding upon him, tendered his resignation as director and stipulated that he 
would remain an employee of the Applicant76. 
The Respondent did not attend that meeting of shareholders and it was 
unanimously voted that he be removed as director and suspended from 
performing any duties. 
The parties were in agreement that at all material times the Applicant 
complied with the Companies Act in removing the Respondent from the office 
of director.77 The Applicant’s attorneys conveyed a letter to the Respondent 
advising him that it was of the view that his employment ended concurrently 
with this removal from office and that there was no position for him in the 
Applicant’s employ. The Respondent accordingly filed an unfair dismissal 
application at the CCMA. 
The Applicant’s counsel sought to argue that the Respondent was not 
dismissed but that his employment with the company terminated 
automatically when he resigned as director and cancelled the shareholders 
agreement. The Applicant also referred to the Applicants articles of 
association in support of this contention. 
The Respondent countered by arguing that he was dismissed from the 
employment of the Applicant, that he was an employee notwithstanding his 
resignation as director and that he was accordingly entitled to the protection 
of the LRA. 
There were two questions before the Court; was the Respondent an 
employee and was he dismissed by the Applicant. The Court found that the 
Applicant did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the Respondent 
was not an employee. The Court deemed it apposite to not only contain its 
finding to factual analyses but also to investigate and analyse the law. 
The Court stated that normally a director may also be an employee of the 
company and will accordingly act in two different capacities. One as director, 
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subject to the Companies Act and the common law duties of care, skill and 
diligence. The director may also be an employee of the company and 
accordingly be governed by the LRA. In support of this averment the Court 
referred to the judgment in the PG Group matter as discussed earlier in this 
dissertation.  
The Court held that there is no reason in law why a director cannot also be 
an employee. To answer the question a court or tribunal must engage in a 
factual enquiry to determine the true nature of the relationship between the 
parties. 
The Respondent’s counsel argued that in terms of the PG Group matter the 
Respondent was indeed an employee and that the LRA should apply to such 
a person even if the articles of association or shareholders agreement 
determines that should a director lose his office this will result in the 
simultaneous termination of his employment. 
The Court restated the principle in PG Group that when a director also holds 
a position as an employee their rights as an employee will not be adversely 
affected. The Court referred to the matter of Whitcutt v Computer Diagnostics 
and Engineering (Pty) Ltd 78  as authority for the proposition that the 
Companies Act does not limit the rights of an employee under the LRA. 
 The Court also held that it is clear that where there is a conflict between the 
LRA and the Companies act, the provisions of the LRA must prevail.79 
The Court referred to the dominant impression test to determine whether or 
not the Respondent was an employee of the Applicant. The Court examined 
criteria which were used in previous cases.80 The Court examined In casu 
incontrovertible facts such as that the Respondent was granted a salary 
increase, that UIF deductions were made, that he was involved in the day to 
day activities of the Applicant and that he received a standard payslip which 
was given to all employees. 
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The shareholders’ agreement also provided that except with the approval of 
80% of the shareholders, the directors shall be in the full employment of the 
company. The Court accordingly held that it was clear that the Respondent 
was indeed an employee of the Applicant.  
Having found that the Respondent was an employee the Court proceeded to 
consider the vexed question of so called automatic termination clauses. The 
Court expressed its hesitation at accepting that an employer and employee 
can contractually agree that an employee’s employment with a company can 
automatically terminate once certain suspensive conditions have been met 
(there are obvious exceptions such as fixed term contracts which expire 
automatically by way of effluxion of time). 
The Court found that any agreement in terms whereof a contract of 
employment or the articles of association of a company provide for the 
automatic termination of employment would contravene the LRA’s prohibition 
on the contractual limitation of the employee’s statutory rights.81 Each and 
every employee has the fundamental right to fair labour practices and such a 
clause would undermine the protection afforded by the Constitution. The 
Court also referred to SA Post Office Ltd v Mampeule82where it was held that 
a clause providing for the automatic termination of a contract of employment 
is invalid. 
The Court further held, after referring to the PG Group and Ntshona cases, 
labour law and company law are distinct from, and operate in different 
spheres. The Court looked at the example of the provisions of the companies 
act that deal with the termination of the directorship of directors. The Court 
stated that it was clear that the shareholders have the right to terminate the 
directorship of any of the directors at their discretion. This does not strip the 
director of a right of recourse in terms of the LRA. 
The Court laid particular emphasis on the fact that the procedure in validly 
dismissing the director (assuming he is also an employee) in terms of the 
LRA is far more onerous and that the pivotal concept is fairness as opposed 
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to lawfulness. The Court unambiguously stated that a lawful removal from 
office in terms of the Companies Act does not guarantee that the company 
would be favoured with a successful outcome in a unfair dismissal case. 
3.3.8 Conclusion 
It appears that this matter has been the death knell for the proposition that a 
director cannot also be regarded as an employee in addition to his position 
as an office bearer of the company. The Court’s judgment is clear and 
unambiguous and the Court made a clear distinction that the LRA and that its 
concomitant rights do not operate in the same sphere or in an inferior 
spectrum as the Companies Act. The LRA states expressly that should there 
in any matter arise a conflict of laws that the provisions of the LRA must 
prevail. 
What the Chilbush case has not confirmed is that every director is 
automatically an employee of the company. The fact remains that certain 
non-executive directors which only perform guidance and advise on 
corporate issues will in all probability not constitute employees in terms of the 
LRA. The regular termination procedure found in the Companies Act would 
be sufficient in severing them from the company.  
The first part of the objective of this dissertation has been answered by this 
case; whether or not directors are also employees of the companies they 
serve can only be answered by engaging in a factual enquiry to determine 
the true nature of the relationship between the parties. The onus to prove that 
a director was not an employee of the company will rest squarely with the 
company due to the presumption of employment contained in the LRA.  
Factors which the Court or Tribunal may assess when developing their 
judgments or rulings include; the prior history of the director, whether they 
received a payslip, statutory deductions from such payslip which would 
indicate remuneration as opposed to a director’s fee, the manner and extent 
in which the director was involved in the running of the day to day activities of 
the Company and the manner in which the company was controlled.  
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It has been illustrated that over the course of the last two decades numerous 
cases have been heard by the Courts where employers have attempted to 
either contract out of the LRA or deny that its directors were dismissed by the 
companies.83 The approach of the Courts has been to look at substance as 
opposed to form (an approach specifically enforced by the Labour- and 
Labour Appeals Courts) with the ever present requirement of fairness and not 
lawfulness.  
The following chapter will deal with comparative legal systems and the 
manner in which the dismissal procedure as it relates to executive 
appointments is followed. It is imperative to stipulate that this comparison is 
subject to the realisation that South Africa’s socio-economic history performs 
and exceptionally large role in the development of public policy and the 
statutory framework of the Republic.  
Accordingly, it is intrinsically difficult to compare a developing nation with 
developed nations where the balance of economic (and perhaps social) 
power is not distributed in the same ratio. Arguably it may be even more 
difficult a task to compare our domestic legal system with that of another 
developing nation with its own distinct socio-economic factors. 
4  International Law 
4.1  Basis of study of comparative legal systems 
For the purposes of brevity only a few unique legal systems will be evaluated 
and analysed in-depth, namely, France, Australia and Singapore. A brief 
overview of unfair dismissal law (or wrongful termination as the international 
parlance coins the subject) as applicable to executives (or their comparable 
position abroad) in certain companies will be given for purposes of 
completeness, inter alia, Sweden, United States of America and Canada. 
4.2  France 
                                                             
83  See in this regard Boumat Ltd v Vaughan 1992 13 ILJ 934 LAC ; Van Rensburg v 
Austen Safe Co 1998 19 ILJ 158 LC ; Long & Another v Chemical Specialities Tvl 
(Pty) Ltd 1987 8 ILJ 523 IC ; Whitcutt v Computer Diagnostics & Engineering (Pty) 
Ltd 1987 8 ILJ 356 IC. 
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The French people are well known for their art, fine dining and wine. A lesser 
known fact is that the French legal system displays a particular affinity to 
strong labour laws even when equated with those of South Africa. 
The French employment law is sourced from the Labor Code, collective 
bargaining agreements and case law of the higher courts in terms of the 
doctrine of stare decisis. The unfair dismissal system is substantially the 
same as South Africa with claimants for unfair dismissal required to first 
attend a conciliation session at the Conciliation Committee of the Labour 
Courts. Should conciliation prove to be fruitless the aggrieved party may 
apply to the Judgment Committee where evidence must be led and a 
judgment handed down.  
Any party aggrieved by the outcome of such a matter set down in the 
Judgment Committee may approach the Court of Appeal in an attempt to 
vindicate his rights. 
One major difference between South African labour jurisprudence and that of 
our Huguenot cousins is the manner in which the French treat the office of 
directors. The universal phenomenon of company law is virtually the same in 
France as in South Africa with the same organisational structure of a board of 
directors reporting to the shareholders who own the company. 
An interesting fact is that the French Labour Code does not specifically 
regulate the working hours of several workers it does not deem to be 
“employees”. Directors, managers of non-limited liability companies are part 
of the category which is not seen as employees. 84 This distinction exists 
despite the fact that there might very well be a director which performs tasks 
relating to the day to day management of the company. 
To fully comprehend the novel manner in which the French approach the 
subject matter of this dissertation is it of cardinal importance to examine the 
semantics of the French language. The general approach in France is that 





directors (as we know them) are not employees of the companies for which 
they work but rather officers of the company discharging a specific function.85 
French company law regulates the relationship between the company and 
the director, not French employment law. A direct translation of the word 
“director” as we understand it translates roughly to “manager” in French. A 
more apt translation for director in terms of an office bearer of the company 
would be “Administrateur”. One similarity between the legal systems is that a 
French director or administrateur does not qualify for the protection of the 
French labour law as such a director is not held to be an employee in terms 
of the definitions in the statute. 
In terms of French law an administrateur may be removed without notice pay 
or even advance notice of such a decision taken to remove the 
administrateur. The only legal requirement is that the reason for the decision 
must be objectively defensible and not vexatious or spurious. It is not defined 
which reasons may constitute an objectively defensible reason for the 
termination of the director’s contract. 
There have also been reported cases where, in addition to holding the office 
of administrateur, the aforementioned has also been found to be an 
employee of the company. The employee could be a director and human 
resources manager at the same time. This overlapping trend between South 
African and French law confirms that there exists a possibility where a 
convergence of French company- and employment law would also overlap. 
The position is much the same as in South Africa where not only must the 
director be removed from office in accordance with the relevant statutory 
provisions or the clauses in the articles of association of the company but 
adherence must also be given to the provisions of the protective clauses of 
the employment law to validly terminate the employment contract between 
the employee and the company. 
It is submitted that the fact that both countries, despite a major difference 
between the socio-economic history of France, a developed nation and South 
                                                             
85  http://aubyn.fr/texte.php?id=. 
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Africa, a developing nation, share this same conundrum of a dual spectrum 
of employment and the holding of the office of director is worthy of a few 
observations in this regard. 
The chief argument against comparing one legal system to another is that 
every country, its history and its people, are vastly different from each other 
and one cannot precisely compare the legal position in one country  to 
another. The fact that both a developed and developing nation share legal 
principles expressly providing for the protection of individuals who are 
directors and employees at the same time can only provide evidence for the 
argument that the affording of protection against unfair dismissal to the 
director is based on the development of legal principles. 
It is internationally accepted and has been mentioned previously in this 
dissertation that the reason for the existence of labour law is to protect 
employees who are on the weak side of the balance of economic power 
between employee and employer. It can be indulged that directors in general 
do not face the same power struggle which the ordinary employee faces.  
When one keeps in mind that the purpose of labour law is to protect those 
who do not have the power to do so themselves it seems illogical to apply the 
protections of the labour law to directors, even if they are employees, who do 
not face an imbalance in the equilibrium of power. 
As will be seen in the preceding sections, this same argument which has 
been raised in the South African courts features prominently in the 
international jurisprudence and legislation. 
4.3  Australia 
The cornerstone of Australian labour law is the Fair Work Act86 which was 
promulgated in 2009 and led to the establishment of the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission.87 
                                                             
86  Act 28 of 2009. 
87  http://www.airc.gov.au/. 
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Similar to our domestic labour law, the FWA only applies to “employees” and 
specifically excludes independent contractors from the protective provisions 
of the act. The FWA rather obtusely defines an employee as “includes a 
reference to a person who is usually such an employee” 88 The definition 
specifically excludes employees on vocational placements.89 
The FWA contains an earnings threshold which provides a jurisdictional 
limitation on certain high earning employees or executives. The threshold 
amount is currently set at 118,000.00 Australian Dollars. Any employee, 
irrespective of their title or position, earning above the aforementioned 
remuneration threshold cap may not apply for an unfair dismissal claim in 
accordance with the provisions on the FWA.90 
The ubiquitous nature of the requirement to balance the bargaining power of 
employees with that of the employer is clearly found in the Australian labour 
law. Executives and other high-earning employees are considered to be 
“sophisticated investors” 91  capable of fairly negotiating the terms and 
conditions of their own employment. These executives who fall within the 
ambit of the definition of an employee are excluded from the protection from 
unfair dismissal. There is no requirement in Australian law to provide a three 
months’ notice period or comparative payment in lieu thereof as proposed in 
the LRA amendment bill discussed earlier in this dissertation. 
The exclusion from the protection offered by the FWA does not render the 
executives and other high earning employees powerless against the 
corporate might of the companies in which they are employed. The excluded 
class of employees retain their common law and statutory rights to damages 
should they be removed unlawfully or for an ulterior purpose. 
Whilst the burden of proof would rest on the excluded class of employees in 
a regular civil suit in the High Court for damages as opposed to the onus to 
prove fairness on the employer in an unfair dismissal action in the Australian 
                                                             
88  S 15. 
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Industrial Relations Commission there are other benefits associated 
therewith.  
In terms of the FWA, compensation awarded to an employee who has lodged 
a successful unfair dismissal claim against an employer is limited to 
compensation equivalent to six months’ remuneration as set at date of 
dismissal. The compensation to be awarded may also not exceed half of the 
amount of the high income threshold which is set by regulation from time to 
time.  
A civil suit in the High Court for damages suffered as a result of the unlawful 
termination of the office of director is only limited to the amount the aggrieved 
party may prove in terms of the principles of the law of delict.92 The basis for 
such action would be found in terms of the common law, contractual law or 
the Australian Corporation Act93. 
The dismissed director would be entitled to sue for damages based on 
various heads of damages including, but not limited to, the removal from 
office prior to the expiration of their term of office, damage to reputation and 
inuria resulting from such a removal from the office of director. 
The most evident difference between the manner in which the Australian law 
differs from South African law (and specifically the LRA amendment bill once 
it is signed into law) is that there is no notice requirement or compensation 
which must be paid to effect the termination of the executive who earns 
above the income threshold amount.  
In terms of Section 188B of the LRA amendment bill either three months’ 
notice must be given to the executive affected or the equivalent of three 
months’ compensation pay. In terms of the FWA the executive or high 
earning employee is specifically excluded from the provisions of the FWA 
dealing with the subject of unfair dismissal claims. The executive, if he is also 
deemed to be an employee of the company, retains the remainder of the 
rights conferred by the FWA in so far as the employee has a right to fair work 
                                                             
92  Or tort law as it is commonly known and referred to in various commonwealth 
nations. 
93  Act 50 of 2001. 
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practices94 and may sue if the company intrudes on those rights irrespective 
of the income threshold amount. 
Executive employees are not specifically excluded from the definition of 
employee and will in general be considered to be employees in addition to 
their role as directors of the company. This is comparatively the same as 
what has been held to be the case throughout the jurisprudence of the South 
African courts. 
It is interesting to note that even though Australian law differentiates between 
employees who earn above the threshold amount these employees are not 
left powerless without a right of recourse should they be removed from office. 
They retain their claim in terms of delict and / or contract law for the unlawful 
termination of their services. The South African equivalent is found in the 
provisions of the company act which specifically reserves such a right of 
recourse for damages a director may suffer as a result of the loss of office of 
director. This right may be vindicated in a regular civil court and instituted in 
accordance with the principles applicable to delictual / law of contract 
principles as the case may be.  
This proves to show that providing high earning employees and / or 
executives with statutory protections in terms of labour law is an unnecessary 
addition to the existing quiver of common, civil or contractual remedies a 
unlawfully terminated director may have in any case. 
4.4 Singapore 
Singapore is one of the most interesting countries in the world to study in 
terms of labour law. A former British colony, a common trait between 
Singapore and South Africa, Singapore embarked on a long term strategy to 
transform the country into an industrial manufacturing powerhouse. The 
move was precipitated as a result of the growing unemployment rate and 
substantial poverty which was beginning to manifest and take hold of the 
newly independent nation. 
                                                             
94  Compare to the safeguard in our LRA regarding unfair labour practices. 
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The surge in manufacturing was created by the introduction of the Singapore 
Economic Development Board95 in the 1960s’. Industrialisation began with 
the development of manufacturing factories for wood, textiles and clothing. 
The country grew to be the chief exporter and market stalwart of Asia’s 
economy. 
One of Singapore’s most attractive economic attributes is the readily 
available affordable labour. As a result thereof many of the world’s largest 
corporations have invested in the development and introduction of factories 
in Singapore.  
Singapore and South Africa share several traits which make them excellent 
countries to compare in terms of labour law. They are both former British 
colonies, have an abundance of unskilled labour available and depend 
mainly on exports to keep the economy on the up. 
The foundation of Singapore’s system of labour law can be found in the 
Singapore Employment Act96. The act contains the usual generic provisions 
which are found in the vast majority of employment codes and legislation 
around the world. The most striking and interesting difference is the definition 
of employee. 
The SEA defines an employee as; 
"employee" means a person who has entered into or works under 
a contract of service with an employer and includes a workman 
and any officer or employee of the Government included in a 
category, class or description of such officers or employees 
declared by the President to be employees for the purposes of this 
Act or any Part or section thereof; but does not include any 
seaman, domestic worker, or any person employed in a 
managerial, executive or confidential position or any person 
belonging to any other class of persons whom the Minister may, 
from time to time by notification in the Gazette, declare not to be 
employees for the purposes of this Act” 
 
                                                             
95  http://www.edb.gov.sg/content/edb/en/why-singapore/about-singapore/our-
history/1960s.html 
96  Act 17 of 1986, as amended. 
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The definition identifies a litany of classes of people who are specifically 
excluded from the status of “employee” and most importantly, for purposes of 
this dissertation, any person employed in a managerial, executive or 
confidential position. The SEA does not define precisely what may be 
regarded as a managerial or executive position but the Ministry of Manpower 
has given the following description when referring to professionals, managers 
and executives: 
 "These functions include the authority to influence or make decision on 
issues such as recruitment, discipline, termination of employment, 
assessment of performance and reward, or involvement in the 
formulation of strategies and policies of the enterprise, or the 
management and running of the business. Professionals are those with 
specialised skills and whose employment terms are comparable to 
those of executives and managers."97 
It is interesting to note that Singapore is one of the few countries in which the 
definition of employee exhibits an express exclusion clause rather than a 
blanket definition which covers the vast majority of people connected to a 
company barring independent contractors.  
On the 21st of November 2013 the Ministry of Manpower announced draft 
amendment bills to extend the protections afforded by the SEA to certain 
groups of professionals, managers and executives. The amendment bill, 
formally entitled the Employment, Parental Leave and other Measures Bill, 
proposes to extend the application of the act to Managers and Executives 
earning up to 4500 Singapore Dollars per month.98  
The only additional requirement which must be fulfilled is in respect of junior 
executives who must have completed a minimum of one year’s service at the 
company prior to being able to institute a claim for unfair dismissal. The 
reasoning behind this suspensive condition is to enable employers to 
pertinently assess the competency of junior executives without the risk of 
onerous pre-dismissal mechanisms should the candidate prove to be ill-
equipped for the position. 
                                                             
97  www.mom.sg/documents/employment-practices/FAQsonemploymentreview 
98  As at the date of writing of this dissertation the conversion is roughly R39,072.52. 
64 
 
The Singaporean model is perhaps one of the best examples of the 
development of labour law in accordance with the evolution of the business 
world. It has been stated ad nauseam that the true purpose of labour law is to 
protect employees who are not sufficiently powerful to counter the bargaining 
power of the employer.  
As more and more start-up companies rise in accordance with the evolution 
of the digital age many directors will receive salaries which may be perceived 
to be middle management salaries in larger enterprises. The extension of 
protective clauses to those executives who are in a weak bargaining position 
is perhaps the most appropriate application of labour law. 
The manner in which the Singaporean model deals with the termination of 
executive employees is preferable to the mechanism suggested by the LRA 
amendment bill. The Singaporean model differentiates between executives in 
a relatively weak bargaining position and seeks to protect only those 
employees who are essentially earning the salary of a decent manager. It 
strives to reach the equilibrium between vulnerable groups and business 
efficacy. 
It must be noted that the core argument underpinning this dissertation is still 
that a director is a sui generis employee as a result of his office. A distinction 
must inevitably be made between an executive director which makes 
decisions according to his mandate and only reports to the Board and a “title” 
director, with little to no authority above that of a manager. 99  The 
Singaporean model serves to ensure that even a “title” director retains some 
manner of protection due to the inadequate bargaining power they have 




                                                             
99  The Singapore model features prominently in the ultimate conclusion to this 




The Swedish Employment Protection Act100 is the source for contemporary 
labour law in Sweden, an EU member state and member of the ILO. The 
opening provisions of the EPA determine that the protective labour laws are 
applicable to public and private sector employees. The EPA specifically 
excludes several groups of people from the application of the act. Employees 
whose duties and conditions of employment are such that they may be 
deemed to occupy a managerial or comparable position form part of the 
group of excluded employees. 
There is no specific definition of executives or directors but it is submitted 
that this falls comfortably within the wide ambit of a “comparable position. It 
seems that the Swedish labour law is primarily concerned with the protection 
of rank and file employees as opposed to the inclusion of managerial 
employees which may not necessarily be much better off than their 
immediate subordinates. 
It is submitted that the Swedish EPA goes too far and offers little protection 
for managerial employees. The exclusion of executives cannot be faulted. 
The exclusion ensures that there is no clash between labour and commercial 
law. The right of the shareholders to appoint and change the leadership of 
the company is unfettered and provides for a swift, simple and inexpensive 
mechanism to effect a change of leadership at the top tiers of the company. 
Even though it may seem as though the labour laws in Sweden do not 
provide sufficient protection for employees the unemployment rate in Sweden 
is a mere 7.9 percent as at October 2013.101  
Sweden is one of the few European Union states to completely exclude 
managers and executives from the application of its labour law. 
 
                                                             






4.6 United States of America 
No comparison of law would be complete without a brief overview of the 
labour law system in the USA. The USA is a federal democracy divided into 
52 states. The Constitution of the USA determines that federal laws receive 
precedence over local or state law dealing with the same subject matter. This 
comparison will thusly be confined to an analysis of federal labour law in the 
USA.102 
The principal federal act dealing with labour law in the USA is the Fair Labour 
Standards act 103 (“FLSA”). The FLSA regulates conditions of employment 
including overtime, annual leave and maximum hours of work inter alia. 
There are certain exemptions and so called “exemption tests”. To be 
considered exempt from the application of the statute an employee must earn 
a minimum of $455.00 per week and a minimum of $100,000.00 per annum. 
Employees who perform executive duties are also exempt from the 
application of the statute. 
Regulations have been promulgated in terms of the FLSA which seek to 
determine and classify what is traditionally considered to be executive duties. 
The non-exhaustive list includes: 
• Employees whose primary duty is the management of the enterprise 
or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof; 
• Customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other 
employees; and 
• Authority to appoint or dismiss employees and whose opinion on the 
promotion, appointment or dismissal of employees carries sufficient 
weight. 
The remainder of the regulations paint a clear picture that the typical 
executive will be exempt from the application of the FLSA. Executives 
typically develop and plan processes and procedures, identify and select 
market strategies to push sales and are engaged with the performance 
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management of subordinates. All of these duties are considered to be 
executive duties.  
The fact that the FLSA does not provide specific protection for executives 
does not automatically mean that an executive will never have a cause of 
action to institute wrongful dismissal claims. The relationship between the 
company and the executive will typically be governed by a contract of 
appointment and the parties will negotiate between themselves the 
procedure and manner in which the company may sever the executive from 
the company and vice versa. 
Typical provisions in contracts of service between executives and companies 
in the USA reflect generic “exit clauses” in terms whereof the executive and 
the company agree on the manner and procedure which the company must 
adhere to should it consider terminating the services of the executive.    
A comparison between South African labour law and the legislation contained 
in the USA is a particularly difficult one to make as a result of the USA’s 
status as the worlds’ economic powerhouse. The most powerful corporations 
in the world emanate from the USA and it comes as no surprise that the 
USA’s labour law is in favour of the corporates.  
That being said it is submitted that the ability to keep the executive 
management of a company dynamic is one of the core competencies 
required to remain competitive in a hyper competitive and vastly changing 
world. The rank and file employees who bear the brunt of the power struggle 
between employer and employee receive sufficient protection from the FLSA. 
With the vast majority of the world’s largest corporate companies emanating 
from the USA it seems as though the exclusion of executives from the ambit 
of protective labour laws does not serve as a bar to the successful 







The relevance of a comparison to Canadian jurisprudence and legislation 
stems from the fact that large sections of the drafting of our Constitution104 
was based upon or influenced by Canadian law as the two countries share 
fundamental Roman law backgrounds. 
The sole source of statutory labour law in Canada is derived from the 
Canada Labour Code105. Canada, like the USA, has a federal law system 
which overrides local or regional law on the same subject matter.  
The CLA defines an employee as: 
“employee” means any person employed by an employer and includes a 
dependent contractor and a private constable, but does not include a person 
who performs management functions or is employed in a confidential capacity 
in matters relating to industrial relations; 
From the abovementioned definition it is clear that the CLA contains an 
express, intrinsic exception in relation to the application of the statute to 
managerial employees (which include executives). 
The unjust dismissal chapter 106 applies only to employees who have served 
at least 12 months’ continuous service with an employer.107 As executives do 
not fall within the ambit of the definition of employee the remainder of the 
CLA does not apply to them and, consequently, their terms of service are 
regulated by commercial law.108 
Historically, South Africa has shared many legal principles the Canadian 
jurisprudence. Canadian law reports have featured in many of our domestic 
law reports regarding criminal, contractual and commercial law. It is 
interesting to note that executives and managerial employees do not enjoy 
protection against unfair dismissal (barring any terms and procedures they 
have negotiated in their contracts of appointment). 
                                                             
104  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
105  1986. 
106  Chapter XIV contained in section 240. 
107  The requirement of 12 months completed service prior to the institution of unfair 
dismissal claims is also found in the labour law of Singapore. 
108  Specifically the Canadian Commercial Corporation  Act 14 of 1985. 
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Whilst the countries have a similar legal background a comparison based 
upon social security and policy legislation is difficult to make as a result of the 
vastly different socio-economic circumstances of the respective countries.  
Canada, one of the world’s foremost zealots of human rights deems it 
apposite to restrict an executive worker to enforcing a contractual claim 
against a company for an unfair termination. It is humbly submitted that the 
Canadian system serves to prove that a country can have exceptionally 
strong human rights views and labour laws yet find the balance between 
individual employment security and business efficacy. The two do not 
necessarily involve a trade-off between each other. 
5 Conclusion 
It is submitted that the current legal position regarding the dismissal of 
directors has been largely codified in the judgments of the Labour- and 
Labour Appeals Court. The Chillibush case has confirmed that, for purposes 
of labour law, directors fall squarely within two distinct groups; 
Directors who are solely holders of the office of director, provide the company 
with expert advice regarding the long term strategy and development of the 
company and are not involved with the day to day running of the company. 
These directors typically earn a director’s fee as compensation for their input 
at the board table and are normally directors of several companies. They do 
not accumulate nor apply for annual leave and are holders of a certain set of 
skills. They are normally only accountable to the shareholders of the 
company. 
The other group of directors are ordinary employees who have been 
promoted in the ranks or been headhunted. These directors are not only 
engaged in top tier board meetings and decisions but are also responsible for 
day to day tasks involving the management of the company. They receive a 
salary from the company from which statutory deductions such as 
unemployment insurance and pay as you earn tax are deducted. They 




A golden thread runs throughout the plethora of law reports examined in this 
dissertation. Directors, subject to their grouping as mentioned above, are 
either holders only of the office of director or hold a dual role where they are 
appointed as directors in terms of the articles of association and remain 
employees of the company.  
It has now been clearly established that compliance with Section 71 of the 
Companies Act will be sufficient to remove the first mentioned type of 
director. What has proved to be more cumbersome (and the thorny issue in 
the vast majority of the law reports) is the removal of the latter type of 
director. 
Such a director may be removed in accordance with the statutory mechanism 
mentioned above or in terms of the company’s articles of association. This 
does however not terminate the employment relationship between the 
company and the director. As seen in the Amazwi Power matter such a 
director may even resign from the office of director and demand to remain in 
the employment of the company.  
To effectively sever the relationship between the company and the latter type 
of director the company is obliged to dismiss the director in accordance with 
the LRA and its relevant codes of good practice. It has already been 
illustrated that there are scenarios when the intervention of the LRA has 
ensured that justice prevails.  
It must also be borne in mind that due to the very nature of how companies 
are structured, with the board of directors reporting to the ultimate owners of 
the company, the shareholders, limitation of the shareholders will must be 
tempered. Due to their size once a company has identified that an issue 
exists within the ranks of its executives it must act concisely and speedily to 
ensure a resolution is made. Problems in the management of a company 
affect more than just the employment of a single employee. Should a 
company suffer accumulated losses as a result of ineptitude, poor 
management or inappropriate business decisions it affects the livelihood of 
all the other employees, directors, shareholders, contractors who depend on 
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the company and the ultimate consumer of the company’s products or 
service.  
Due to the above reasons it has been submitted and argued that the position 
of a director as a dual holder of office and employment should not render 
them to be employees in the regular sense. The LRA and BCEA make a 
distinction between employees and senior managerial employees for certain 
of the rights afforded to employees. It follows that it can be argued that a 
director who is also considered to be an employee of the company is in fact a 
sui generis employee.  
The learned author, H Stoop, also expresses the view that South African 
labour law could benefit from a law reform process. Stoop argues that  
“A more flexible solution may be needed, especially if one considers the 
matter from the company's point of view. It is often true that a director's 
position is a composite one. This is because practical requirements 
frequently dictate that the two capacities should vest in the same person. If 
one allows a director to resign from one component of this composite post, 
an extra post, possibly superfluous, would in many cases have to be created 
for the director who has resigned. This might prove especially problematic for 
smaller companies which do not have the capacity to accommodate the extra 
position. Furthermore, in instances where there has been a breakdown in 
trust, retaining the former director in any position whatsoever may be 
untenable. In other words, automatic terminations of employment clauses 
serve an important purpose in a company law context and simply disallowing 
them is perhaps an unnecessarily legalistic approach.”109 
It has been argued above that section 71 of the Companies Act provides 
sufficient protection for directors in that it mandates that certain conditions be 
met prior to the termination of a director. The Companies Act requires the 
director to receive adequate notice of the nature and date of the impending 
resolution and be afforded an opportunity to make representations on the 
reasons why he should not be removed from office.  
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It may be accepted that all the company has to do is ensure legal compliance 
with the subsections of the statute, allow the soon to be ex director to make 
their representations then rubber stamp the predetermined voting order to 
pass the resolution. The Companies Act however, specifically provides that 
the director is not stripped of his right of recourse for damages which he may 
prove as a result of his loss of office or any other office as a result of the 
resolution passed at the meeting.  
An aggrieved director may then approach the relevant court seeking to 
enforce his damages claim. The court presiding over such matter will have to 
enquire upon the company’s reason for the termination and the court will 
have to determine whether the company is blameworthy or not.  
It is humbly submitted that a director removed in terms of the Companies Act 
has sufficient protection in the form of a right of recourse in the ordinary 
courts to vindicate his rights. The further protection offered by the LRA is 
superfluous and is an excessive limitation of the shareholder’s right to 
appoint and remove directors from the company they own. In certain unfair 
dismissal cases it has been held that informal meetings between employees 
and their superiors were de facto hearings and the employees were provided 
ample opportunity to state their case where they have been accused of 
misconduct. Stoop argues that:  
“It is true that reinstatement will not always be ordered as the LRA does 
indeed recognize the fact that this is not always a suitable remedy. However, 
it may not be appropriate to sanction the company at all. Arguably, the right 
of the general meeting to remove board members should not be undermined 
by labour law provisions; especially not given the fact that board 
accountability and shareholder activism is becoming increasingly important in 
the current socio-economic climate. In regulating the matter, labour law and 
company law currently co-exist, but each does little to enhance the efficiency 
of the other. 
The restriction placed on the removal of ex officio directors and directors 
appointed by designated persons in the 2008 Companies Act protects such 
directors from arbitrary removal to some extent: the Act affords the director 
the opportunity to state his case and it makes provision for the court to review 
the removal and for damages to be awarded when appropriate. In spite of 
these remedies the new Act does not provide for the substantive and 
procedural fairness that labour law does, especially not in the case of a 
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director appointed by the shareholders. Although it is conceded that such 
protective measure will at times be appropriate this will certainly not always 
be the case.” 
 
This begs the question why a meeting of shareholders in terms of section 70 
of the Companies Act cannot be equated with a disciplinary hearing which 
has become the cornerstone of procedural fairness in our law of dismissal. It 
is humbly submitted that the current legal position where a bona fide director 
appointed in terms of the Companies Act or the articles of association must 
be afforded two “hearings” is unnecessarily time consuming and onerous. 
The spirit and purport of the LRA was to ensure that employees who are 
caught on the back end of the balance of power be afforded adequate 
protection. It is incomprehensible that the purpose of the LRA was to ensure 
directors receive effectively two hearings before their services may be 
terminated. 
One cannot place a director and a regular blue collar employee on the same 
playing field. The proposed amendments to the LRA as discussed above will 
no doubt be utilized to a large extent in securing the dismissals of directors 
and senior managerial employees however this can hardly be called fair and 
equitable for the majority of companies in South Africa. Few companies can 
truly afford to pay an executive three months’ salary in lieu of dismissal.  
Evidence for the proposition that a director is a sui generis employee can be 
found in the fact that a court is unable to order the reinstatement of that 
employee to the office of director following a successful unfair dismissal suit. 
The court can at most order the company to take the director back into its 
hierarchy but a different position will have to be made to accommodate such 
an employee. Unlike the dismissal of any other type of employee the Court 
cannot order the company concerned, even if it was manifestly unjust, the 
primary remedy provided by the LRA.  
The court’s reluctance (or inability) to order such reinstatement orders comes 
from the fact that this would be a gross intrusion on company law and would 
effectively render shareholder rights nugatory in this regard. When one 
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considers that the primary purpose of the LRA is to ensure that employees 
are not unfairly dismissed it must be kept in mind that the principal remedy 
employed by the CCMA and the Labour Courts is a reinstatement order. 
The fact that the CCMA or Labour Courts cannot reinstate a dismissed 
director back into his office as such lends credence to the argument that a 
director must be considered as a sui generis employee. It may be argued that 
the reinstatement order is directed not at such a dismissed director’s office 
which he held but his employment relationship with the company. Whilst this 
argument does seek to provide clarity and attempts to elucidate the 
perception that the director held two distinct relationships within the company 
there are certain questions it cannot answer. 
One such question relates to a standard provision in a reinstatement order 
declaring that the dismissed employee be reinstated on terms not less 
favourable or the same as the ones which were applicable on the date of 
dismissal. 
Reinstating an employee and paying him the same salary he earned prior to 
his dismissal is only one aspect of such an order. Holding the office of 
director is accompanied with a sense of pride, prestige and dignity. Should a 
director be reinstated as merely an employee it serves to reason that they 
would feel isolated as they would not be able to perform many of the same 
tasks they would have as directors. Certain actions may only be performed 
by directors specifically concerning the opening of accounts, changing of 
bank details and an array of others which bind the company.  
In addition thereto, it has been established by the Labour Courts, particularly 
in cases of unfair suspension that irrespective of the fact that an employee 
continues to receive remuneration while placed on suspension, the ability to 
work and perform your tasks form part of the integral right to dignity. Some 
people feel defined by the work that they do and a reinstatement as anything 




The reinstatement order will also cause unease in the workplace and the 
former director will now be on the same hierarchical plane as many of his 
subordinates in his former position. The director will have effectively become 
a mere colleague of theirs and the concomitant respect which comes with the 
title of director will be lost. The final result leaves the company overstaffed, 
the employees annoyed and the former director dismayed.  
Much like a divorce a termination between a company and one or more of its 
directors should attempt to hold onto the “clean break” principle as far as 
possible. The long term affects are simply nothing except negative. It is not 
argued that directors should not be protected against unscrupulous 
employers but merely that a legislative reform process is required to ensure 
that companies are not exorbitantly burdened and pulled down when the time 
has come to shuffle the positions at the top. 
A director who may only rely on the Companies Act for protection may find 
solace in the fact that his remuneration, benefits and work environment is 
commensurate with this role and responsibilities at the upper echelons of the 
organisational structure. Another proponent of the ideology that directors are 
sui generis employees can be found in the fact that directors are burdened 
with a collection of fiduciary duties and responsibilities which do not apply ex 
lege to mere employees of the company.  
The role a director performs in the success of a company cannot be 
understated, a director is the mechanism through which the shareholders 
control and manage the company, this is the sole reason for affording such a 
vast array of important and onerous duties and responsibilities upon its 
executive officers. The same level of commitment, professionalism and skill 
is not expected of ordinary employees yet forms the cornerstone of the 
employment and appointment of a director. It is humbly submitted that these 
factors are valuable in ascertaining the true form of employment between a 
company and its directors. 
The law as a whole makes a monumental distinction between employees and 
directors yet only the LRA does not differentiate between types of employees 
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(barring senior managerial employees110). A vast body of international law 
and jurisprudence provides support for the notion that a director is a sui 
generis type of employee and not necessarily requiring special protection in 
terms of labour law.  
Singapore, the USA and Canada amongst others provide explicitly for the 
exclusion of executives from the protective provisions of the respective 
labour laws of the countries.  Many of these countries have advocated the 
use of an earnings threshold system in addition to the non-applicability of 
unfair dismissal rights to executive employees. This strikes a balance 
between the legal principles of affording protection to employees yet is also 
alive to the fact that not all employees are on equal ground when it comes to 
the distribution of power in the office. 
Irrespective of the nature of the mechanism which will eventually be adopted 
by the legislature the most important factor behind the amendment is the 
acknowledgment that directors’ are a group of sui generis employees and 
should not be treated in the same fashion as blue collar works in the 
employment law sphere. 
  
                                                             
110  Which may include directors but this is unfortunately a matter which is far beyond the 
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